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This Article assesses the political consequences of the Supreme
Court's decision in Baker v. Carr and the related cases
establishing the one-person, one-vote rule for legislative
redistricting. In the immediate aftermath of the decisions, analysts
were surprised to find few measurable effects of the kind predicted
beforehand and implicit in the Court's rationale for its
intervention. Forty years of conflicting evidence and empirical
study provide a murky reservoir from which to draw lessons about
the impact of one person, one vote. This Article takes as its task
sifting through and evaluating the existing literature, while also
partially filling in some of the gaping holes that exist. Although
the impact of the cases themselves may be felt today in everything
from social policy favoring urban and suburban communities to
the Supreme Court's intervention in and resolution of the 2000
election, this Article focuses on the effect of one person, one vote
on electoral competition and legislative representation. Noting the
rise in the incumbency advantage since 1966, the Article canvasses
the voluminous relevant literature to conclude that one person,
one vote is partially to blame for the decline in electoral
competition. However, the same cannot be said, at this point,
regarding party competition for control of state legislatures, which
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appears to have risen in the wake of one person, one vote even if
not because of it.
Examining the impact of the Court's decisions on "representation"
proves an equally difficult task, but one that this Article tackles
with novel methods. First, the Article examines the impact of one
person, one vote in those states that only redistricted one house in
response to the Court's initial decisions. By comparing political
changes that take place in the newly reapportioned house with
those in the "control" house, the Article attempts to isolate the
independent effect of the Supreme Court's decision. Although
redistricting had no uniform partisan consequences across the
nation, it did help Democrats or Republicans in particular states in
predictable ways. Second, the Article looks at ten states that,
before Baker, had one equitably apportioned house and one
severely malapportioned house. It finds that after the one-person,
one-vote cases the differences between the chambers narrowed.
Third, for four state senates the Article "draws" the 1960 district
lines onto the 2000 political data in order to find out whether the
lines existing pre-Baker would be more or less representative than
the actual 2000 lines. We find that the 1960 lines, if in place today,
would often be less "biased" than the ones currently existing.
From these four small empirical studies, the Article concludes that
the one-person, one-vote rule had few uniform effects throughout
the political system, but that in certain political contexts it
interacted with other electoral and institutional variables to cause
substantial political change.
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In his memoirs, Chief Justice Earl Warren described Baker v.
Carr' as "the most important case of [his] tenure on the Court."2 For
those who thought that Brown v. Board of Education3 might deserve
the honor, Warren reminded them that equal legislative
representation for African Americans would have made Brown
unnecessary Address inequalities in the political process, the theory
went, and substantive equality at the point of policy-making and
policy benefits would follow.5  Formerly the accommodating
Governor of California when its senate allotted the entire city of Los
Angeles just a single seat, Chief Justice Warren later "concluded that
[malapportionment] was a matter for the courts to decide when I saw
what effect disproportionate representation had in Tennessee and
remembered my California experience."6
Measured by their reach and sweep, the one-person, one-vote
cases may represent the Court's most dramatic intervention into
politics in its history. Within just a few years, almost every legislative
institution in America reorganized itself to comply with the decisions.
Few, if any, precedents in American constitutional law have had
similarly immediate and far-reaching effects. Within four years of
Baker, district lines in forty-six states had been challenged in court.
All but three states reapportioned their state legislatures, and
nineteen redrew their congressional districts.7
1. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
2. EARL WARREN, THE MEMOIRS OF EARL WARREN 306 (1977).
3. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
4. John Hart Ely, The Chief, 88 HARV. L. REv. 11, 12 (1974). Of course, having
been completely barred from voting in much of the South, African Americans at the time
of Brown or even Baker often had no judicially protected right to vote. Addressing
problems of vote dilution through discriminatory malapportionment could only become a
primary goal of voting rights litigators once the right to cast a ballot (meaningful or not)
was protected.
5. Warren himself, more than the law professors who later rationalized his political
process opinions, considered the harm of malapportionment to be individual and dignitary
in addition to instrumental or abstractly procedural. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S.
533, 561 (1964) (" 'The right to vote is personal,'" quoting United States v. Bathgate, 246
U.S. 220, 227 (1918)); id. at 567 ("To the extent that a citizen's right to vote is debased, he
is that much less a citizen.").
6. WARREN, supra note 2, at 310.
7. Leo F. Kennedy, Legislative Organization and Services, in THE COUNCIL OF
2002] 1301
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Almost immediately following the Court's decision in Baker,
political scientists, like politicians and pundits, began to speculate as
to the likely winners and losers as a result of the new rules governing
districting. Would the new regime lead to greater representation of
the growing urban centers as the advocates in the cases suggested and
the decisions implied? Which political party was more likely to
benefit from the decisions? Would incumbents-either individual
officeholders or the party controlling a given state legislature-
become more vulnerable to challenges or susceptible to turnover?
The early evidence and conclusions were disappointing for those
who saw in Baker and its progeny a "reapportionment revolution."8
Observers could draw few, if any, conclusions that one group or party
systematically benefited as a result of the new, more accurate
apportionments, and still fewer conclusions as to the public policy
changes reapportionment wrought. Moreover, to the degree one
could discern systematic effects, they appeared to be perverse-going
against the decisions' partial justification of "clearing the channels of
political change." 9 Incumbents, for example, were more likely to be
reelected in the post-Baker era than they were previously. 10
In the forty years since Baker, a substantial body of evidence has
developed concerning the effect of the one-person, one-vote rule. We
may have reached a point where we can say that either we know the
political effects of those decisions or we never will.11 What follows in
this Article is an assessment of the available evidence and literature
on the impact of one person, one vote on two features of the
American political system: political competition and legislative
representation. We focus on competition and representation because
advocates for the one-person, one-vote rule often expressed their
arguments for judicial intervention in those terms. 2 Gerrymandering
got its name, after all, from Governor Elbridge Gerry's attempt to
skew district lines for the Massachusetts legislature to disadvantage
STATE GOVERNMENTS, 18 THE BOOK OF THE STATES, 1970-71, at 57-58 (1971); Herbert
Wiltsee, Legislative Organization and Services, in THE COUNCIL OF STATE
GOVERNMENTS, 16 THE BOOK OF THE STATES, 1966-67, at 38-40 (1967).
8. GORDON E. BAKER, THE REAPPORTIONMENT REVOLUTION:
REPRESENTATION, POLITICAL POWER AND THE SUPREME COURT (1966).
9. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW 105-34 (1980).
10. See notes 60-76 infra and accompanying text.
11. Of course, because the one-person, one-vote rule continues to constrain each
decennial redistricting, a new set of "effects" comes every ten years, in one sense.
12. See generally RICHARD C. CORTNER, THE APPORTIONMENT CASES (1970)'
(describing the various briefs filed in Baker, Reynolds, and the other one-person, one-vote
cases).
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his Federalist opponents. Likewise the unchanging rural rotten
boroughs of the Tennessee counties that gave rise to Baker skewed
representation in that state toward certain interests and away from
others. More important than the pre-Baker advocacy for one person,
one vote, subsequent theorizing about the proper role of courts in
regulating politics has focused on representation and competition as
criteria for judicial intervention. 3 We also choose these "dependent
variables," if you will, because they may be amenable to empirical
tests with data that are more readily available and understandable to
the average law review reader. However, because we concentrate on
specific notions of competition (between candidates in districts and
between parties for control of a legislature) and representation (as
defined by a lack of partisan bias in the political system), we
recognize that this Article leaves to others the task of investigating
other important questions regarding the political effects of the one-
person, one-vote cases. A comprehensive treatment of such effects
would analyze (1) all subsequent judicial interventions into the
political process for which those cases may have been indirect
precedent,14 (2) the effect of one person, one vote on procedure and
13. See ELY, supra note 9 (suggesting representation reinforcement as proper role for
judicial intervention); Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets:
Partisan Lockups of the Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643, 644-52 (1998)
(arguing for shift of focus in cases of political regulation from a rights-based approach to
an emphasis on background markets in partisan control); Richard H. Pildes, The Theory of
Political Competition, 85 VA. L. REV. 1605 (1999) (defending judicial intrusion into the
political process to promote competition); Nathaniel Persily & Bruce E. Cain, The Legal
Status of Political Parties: A Reassessment of Competing Paradigms, 100 COLUM. L. REV.
775, 788-91 (2000) (describing and criticizing the "political markets" paradigm); Nathaniel
Persily, Candidates v. Parties: The Constitutional Constraints on Primary Ballot Access
Laws, 89 GEO. L.J. 2181, 2189-91 (2001) (examining the effect of primary ballot access
laws on competition and representation); Nathaniel Persily, Toward a Functional Defense
of Political Party Autonomy, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 750, 793-815 (2001) (arguing that
competition and representational concerns justify judicial intervention to protect political
party autonomy and citing other articles making similar arguments).
14. One could view Baker as setting the stage for the Court's intervention into the
arenas of campaign finance, ballot access, vote dilution, race and redistricting, political
party regulation, and even creating the right to vote. Those that do so (perhaps including
Professor Schotland, who would have us investigate these larger effects, see Roy Shotland,
The Limits of Being "Present at the Creation," 80 N.C. L. REV. 1505, 1511-12 (2002))
would then count among Baker's effects a legal-political regime under which, for example,
the following laws are unconstitutional: poll taxes, congressional term limits, regulations
of most campaign expenditures (but not most contributions), most regulations of political
party nomination processes, districting plans that have the intent and effect of
discriminating against racial minorities or use race as "the predominant factor," state court
opinions that provide indeterminate standards for presidential election recounts,
restrictive ballot access laws for minor parties and independent candidates, and ballot
notations that reflect a candidate's voting record or stances. And if these constitutional
2002] 1303
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policy outputs of both state governments and the House of
Representatives, 15 and (3) how Baker may have affected distribution
of power among urban, suburban, and rural constituencies.16
rules are a product of Baker, then all political developments (for example, the election of
our current president) or legislation that arose as a product of or in response to these rules
can be considered an "effect" of the Court's intervention into the political thicket in Baker
and its progeny. Such a game of "This is the House that Jack Built" is worth playing in
another article, although we think it impossible to prove that Baker "caused" these legal
rules or their concomitant and dramatic effects on the political process. Moreover, Baker
was not the first case of judicial intervention into politics (see, for example, the White
Primary Cases), so the blame (or praise) earned by Baker's precedent of political
intervention, at the very least, should be spread around. (The White Primary Cases refer
to the series of cases where the Court struck down state laws, party rules, and informal
mechanisms that denied African Americans the right to vote in Democratic party
primaries. See Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 468-70 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S.
649, 662-66 (1944); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73, 88-89 (1932); Nixon v. Herndon, 273
U.S. 536,540-41 (1927).)
15. Others have examined whether one person, one vote led to significant policy
changes. The early consensus was against any dramatic policy change, but newer studies
suggest a pro-urban policy effect. Those who found little public policy change include
Herbert Jacob, The Consequences of Malapportionment: A Note of Caution, 43 Soc.
FORCES 256, 256-61 (1964); Thomas R. Dye, Malapportionment and Public Policy in the
States, 27 J. POL. 586, 595-601 (1965); Richard Hofferbert, The Relation Between Public
Policy and Some Structural and Environmental Variables in the American States, 60 AM.
POL. Sci. REv. 73 (1966); David Brady & Douglas Edmonds, One Man, One Vote-So
What?, 4 TRANS-ACrION, Mar. 1967, at 941; Bryan R. Fry & Richard F. Winters, The
Politics of Redistribution, 64 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 508 (1970); Robert S. Erikson,
Reapportionment and Policy: A Further Look at Some Intervening Variables, 219 ANNALS
OF THE NEW YORK ACADEMY OF SCIENCES 280 (1973); William E. Bicker, The Effects of
Malapportionment in the States-A Mistrial, in REAPPORTIONMENT IN THE 1970S (Nelson
W. Polsby ed., 1971) (critiquing the relevant literature). Those finding minor policy
effects include Allan G. Pulsipher & James L. Weatherby, Jr., Malapportionment, Party
Competition and the Functional Distribution of Governmental Expenditures, 62 AM. POL.
Sci. REv. 1207, 1219 (1968); Roger A. Hanson & Robert E. Crew, Jr., The Policy Impact
of Reapportionment, 8 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 69, 82-90 (1973); H. George Frederickson &
Yong Hyo Cho, Legislative Apportionment and Fiscal Policy in the American States, 27 W.
POL. Q. 5, 5-10 (1974). Modern studies that argue that the one-person, one-vote rule had
major policy consequences include Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congress,
the Courts and Public Policy: Consequences of the One Man, One Vote Rule, 32 AM. J.
POL. Sci. 388, 409-12 (1988) (finding that congressional budget allocations were less
biased in favor of rural areas after 1964); Stephen Ansolabehere et al., Equal Votes, Equal
Money: Court-Ordered Redistricting and the Distribution of Public Expenditures in the
American States (2000) (finding that the one-person, one-vote decisions led to a
redistribution of approximately seven billion dollars to more populous counties), available
at http://econ-www.mit.edu/faculty/snyder/files/equalvotes-final.pdf (on file with the
North Carolina Law Review). Also, some have argued that once the courts decalcified
state political systems by forcing decennial redistricting based on equal population, state
governments became "real" governments. See, e.g., Abner Mikva, Justice Brennan and the
Political Process: Assessing the Legacy of Baker v. Carr, 1995 U. ILL. L. REv. 683, 686-87;
Schotland, supra note 14, at 1511-12.
16. We briefly consider the relationship between urbanization and representation
post-Baker when we examine the partisan effect of the equal population rule on state
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Recognizing these limitations, this study proceeds in four parts.
Part I begins with a brief explanation of the hypotheses that underlie
these opinions of the Court and the arguments of their later
defenders. 17 The arguments for one person, one vote fall into three
general categories: protecting the right to an equally weighted vote,
promoting electoral competition, and furthering more accurate
representation.
Parts II and III examine the wealth of empirical studies of the
impact of the one-person, one-vote rule on competition and
representation, particularly for congressional elections.18 A rather
complicated story emerges from the literature, but we think certain
conclusions can be drawn. The creation of the one-person, one-vote
rule, acting alongside other political developments and within certain
institutional contexts, had identifiable effects on competition and
representation. The precise impact of one person, one vote in a given
state often depended on who controlled the redistricting process (one
party, both parties, or a court) and the degree of malapportionment
in the pre-Baker legislature. Depending on who exercised control, a
redistricting plan could bias the electoral system in favor of one party
at the expense of another or in favor of incumbents at the expense of
challengers.
In Part IV, we present some new empirical analysis of state
legislative elections to examine the effect of one person, one vote on
partisan competition for control of state legislatures and on
representational bias.' 9 We first look at those states that underwent
changes in partisan control in their state legislatures in the mid-sixties
and ask whether one person, one vote is partly responsible. Although
the number of state legislative chambers changing control increased
substantially in the 1960s, we cannot attribute the rise to one person,
one vote. Second, we look at those states that redistricted only one
house of their legislature in the wake of Baker ° The result for us is a
valuable natural experiment in which we can hold constant (to some
extent) many other variables except the instance of redistricting
based on one person, one vote. We find context-specific partisan
legislatures. We find that urban-based parties benefited from the one-person, one-vote
rule. See infra text accompanying notes 93-102. For a more extensive analysis of these
issues, see McCubbins & Schwartz, supra note 15, and Ansolabehere et al., supra note 15.
17. See infra notes 22-59 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 60-89 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 90-106 and accompanying text.
20. Before Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), many thought that Baker's
requirement of equal population applied to only one legislative house.
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efforts from the move to one person, one vote. Third, we look at ten
states, which, before Baker, had the greatest disparity in
malapportionment between their two chambers-for example, where
the state assembly was nearly equally apportioned and the state
senate was wildly malapportioned. The advent of one person, one
vote, we find, decreased political differences between the two houses
in these states, such that the partisan balance in each house became
more similar after equipopulous redistricting (that is, the percent
Democrat of in the house became similar to the percent Democrat in
the senate).
In Part V, we perform a counterfactual experiment, asking what
would have happened if district lines changed by the Court's decisions
were in force today.2' We examine several states covered by the
original one-person, one-vote cases (as well as Earl Warren's own
California) and map the district lines as they existed before Baker v.
Carr onto current political data. We then compare these
counterfactual winners to the actual ones who have been victorious
under the regime of one person, one vote. We find that the pre-
Baker lines are, in most cases, more representative than the ones
existing today.
This Article concludes by situating the arguments presented here
in the larger literature on the regulation of politics.
Before launching into our explanation, a cautionary note is in
order. From the standpoint of a political scientist attempting to study
the political effects of Baker and its progeny, the most unfortunate
aspect of the one-person, one-vote cases is their timing. The period
between 1962, when the Court decided Baker, and the 1970 census
(which was then used for the first decennial redistricting) is arguably
the most turbulent period in American political history since the Civil
War. The assassination of President Kennedy, the subsequent and
related landslide election of Lyndon Johnson over Barry Goldwater
in 1964, the civil rights struggle both in the streets and in Congress
with the passage of the Civil Rights Act and Voting Rights Act, the
related defection of Dixiecrats from the Democratic Party and
concomitant rise (albeit nascent at the time) of the Republican Party
in the South, the Vietnam War, and the turbulent 1968 election
occurred around the same time that state governments were
redrawing their lines to comply with the edicts from the Supreme
Court and lower federal courts. Fundamental and transformative
political changes (apart from redistricting) took place during the
21. See infra notes 107-23 and accompanying text.
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sixties. We therefore proceed with great care in assessing the
independent importance of the shock the Supreme Court's decisions
sent through the political system of that decade, as well as the
enduring importance of that change (as opposed to others of that
decade) for American politics over the next forty years.
Nevertheless, we are now in a position to make some conclusions
about the independent effect of the decisions, and regarding those
issues over which debate continues to rage, we think it important that
lawyers and legal analysts understand the terms of the debate.
I. THE COMPETING THEORETICAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE ONE-
PERSON, ONE-VOTE RULE
The one-person, one-vote cases are rich reservoirs of political
philosophy. One must look beyond their texts, however, to capture
fully the justifications for equal population in districting. Many would
look twenty-five years earlier to the famous footnote four of United
States v. Carolene Products' for a process-reinforcement and
minority-protection justification for the one-person, one-vote rule.
Others might look later, to John Hart Ely's seminal work, Democracy
and Distrust, which provided the most emphatic advocacy of a robust
role for courts in cases where they could "clear[] the channels of
political change."
As we see it, three general classes of arguments support the one-
person, one-vote rule. The first comes out most prominently in Chief
Justice Warren's opinion for the Court in Reynolds v. Sims, but gets
somewhat overwhelmed in the scholarly debate. That opinion
emphasized the dignitary value of the right to vote and suggested that
22. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). In footnote
four, the Court stated:
There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of
constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific
prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten amendments, which
are deemed equally specific when held to be embraced within the Fourteenth. It
is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which restricts those political
processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable
legislation, is to be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under the general
prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment than are most other types of
legislation.... Nor need we enquire whether similar considerations enter into
the review of statutes directed at particular religious, or national or racial
minorities; whether prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a
special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political
processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call
for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.
Id. (citations omitted).
23. ELY, supra note 9, at 105-35.
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malapportionment could "debase" a citizen's right to vote, just as
would a denial of the franchise altogether. The notion that
malapportionment violated equal protection, per se, regardless of its
political consequences, is one not amenable to empirical test
(although we point out logical difficulties below).
The second and third rationales involve some assumptions about
the consequences of malapportionment and imply that a world with
equipopulous districting will be politically different than one without
it. We categorize these interrelated rationales under the rubrics of
competition and representation. By competition, we refer to the
process-reinforcement argument of Ely and Carolene Products that
malapportionment required judicial remediation because it allowed
those with power to insulate themselves from competitors by rigging
electoral rules against those who would replace them. The "ins"
could keep the "outs" out by drawing district lines that perpetually
favored the power structure of the status quo. By representation, we
mean the accuracy of the translation of votes into seats.
Malapportionment was thought to favor some groups, such as rural
voters, at the expense of others, such as suburbanites and city
dwellers. Equipopulous districting, some argued, would help
minimize the distortion of expressed voter preferences caused by the
corralling of interests in such a way that the composition of the
legislature poorly resembled the composition of the electorate.
These concepts, as we note below,24 are deceptively simple. Each
carries with it a lot of normative and conceptual baggage. Before
"testing" the hypotheses of Baker v. Carr and its progeny, however, it
may be useful to point out the problems in specification and
definition that these hypotheses imply.
A. Malapportionment as an Assault on Individual Dignity
The idea of malapportionment as a defect in the political process
is so entrenched in our thinking that we often minimize the principle
that takes up the most space in the Court's opinions: namely, that the
state should accord equal concern and respect for the individual's
right to vote. Although this Article is more concerned with the
consequentialist thinking underlying the Court's opinions and their
later defenders, it is worth noting that the lion's share of those
opinions treat malapportionment as more than a mere systemic ill,
but as a form of "invidious" discrimination and an abridgement of a
fundamental right. Malapportionment constituted an assault on
24. See infra notes 25-59 and accompanying text.
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individual dignity, the Court held, by assigning a greater value to one
member of the polity than another. This injury to individual dignity
seemed to arise from several sources: an infringement on a right of
basic citizenship, the state's implicit devaluing of one person's voice
over another's, and the unequal distribution of political influence
malapportionment caused.
In his opinion for the Court in Reynolds, Chief Justice Warren
emphasized the "personal nature" of the right to vote. "Each citizen
has an inalienable right to full and effective participation in the
political process[] .... To the extent that a citizen's right to vote is
debased," he wrote, "he is that much less a citizen." 25 Voting was a
"human right"-one of the "basic civil rights of man" that was
entitled to special protection because it was "preservative of other
basic civil and political rights. '26 Although malapportionment did not
overtly deny the franchise, it could reduce the value of an individual's
vote to just a hair above zero.27 The cost that malapportioned
districts forced some voters to bear based on the fortuity of their
25. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 567. On June 15, 1964, the Court decided five companion
cases to Reynolds involving challenges to legislative apportionments in Colorado,
Delaware, Virginia, Maryland, and New York. See Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly
of Colo., 377 U.S. 713, 715-34 (1964) (Colorado); Roman v. Sincock, 377 U.S. 695, 697-
708 (1964) (Delaware); Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678, 680-90 (1964) (Virginia); Maryland
Comm. for Fair Representation v. Tawes, 377 U.S. 656, 658-73 (1964) (Maryland);
WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 377 U.S. 633, 635-53 (1964) (New York). In each of these
companion cases, the Court echoed the concern from Reynolds that malapportionment
abridged the individual right to vote. See Lucas, 377 U.S. at 736 ("An individual's
constitutionally protected right to cast an equally weighted vote cannot be denied even by
a vote of a majority of a State's electorate, if the apportionment scheme adopted by the
voters fails to measure up to the requirements of the Equal Protection Clause."); Roman,
377 U.S. at 711 (stating that legislative malapportionment amounts to "an impermissible
deprivation of appellees' right to an adequate voice in the election of legislators to
represent them"); Davis, 377 U.S. at 690 (holding that Virginia's legislative
malapportionment was a violation of the Equal Protection Clause); Tawes, 377 U.S. at 675
(stating that "considerations of history and tradition" will not justify a violation of the
Equal Protection Clause); WMCA, 377 U.S. at 653 ("However complicated or
sophisticated an apportionment scheme might be, it cannot, consistent with the Equal
Protection Clause, result in a significant undervaluation of the weight of the votes of
certain of a State's citizens merely because of where they happen to reside.").
26. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 561-62.
27. See id. at 562; see also Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104-05 (2000) (per curiam)
("Having once granted the right to vote on equal terms, the State may not, by later
arbitrary and disparate treatment, value one person's vote over that of another."); cf Bd.
of Estimate v. Morris, 489 U.S. 688, 698 (1989) ("[A] citizen is ... shortchanged if he may
vote for only one representative when citizens in a neighboring district, of equal
population, vote for two."); Town of Lockport v. Citizens for Cmty. Action at the Local
Level, Inc., 430 U.S. 259, 264 (1977) ("[T]he Equal Protection Clause cannot tolerate the
disparity in individual voting strength that results when elected officials represent districts
of unequal population.").
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residence was tantamount to region-based disfranchisement. Unlike
most other rights, the right to vote required a certain action by the
government (namely, tabulation and aggregation on an equal basis)
for the right to be protected and to gain meaning. 8 Therefore, so
long as one agreed that the Constitution protected the right to vote,2
9
surely it must follow that the state cannot aggregate votes in such a
way as to drain the right to vote of all its meaning.
More than merely an infringement on voting rights, however,
malapportionment sent the voters a signal about the value of their
position in the polity. By according greater weight to some citizens'
votes, the state sent a message regarding individual worth
°
.
3  Of
course, these harms were not merely "expressive";31 they had serious
instrumental consequences for the "debased" individual. The
opinions speak in terms of "equal weight," equal voting "power," and
an "equally effective voice," suggesting that the Court was chiefly
concerned with the "inputs" of government.32 By giving some voters
a greater electoral voice than others, the state denied to the
disfavored voters their equal opportunity to participate in the
democracy. This denial of equal protection occurred merely from the
number of people per district, not from any subsequent effect at the
28. See Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 554-55; see also Wisconsin v. City of New York, 517 U.S.
1, 12 (1996) (stating that the "right to have one's vote counted" is fundamental); Gray v.
Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 380 (1963) ("Every voter's vote is entitled to be counted once. It
must be correctly counted and reported."); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 207-08 (1962)
(concluding that the right to vote includes a right to have it counted).
29. Such a right was not fully established until after the one-person, one-vote cases,
incidentally. See Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663,665 (1966).
30. See Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 557-58; see also Gray, 372 U.S. at 380-81 (implying that
the weighting of votes based on place of residence within a state would be tantamount to
unequal treatment of individuals).
31. Although, perhaps they were also expressive. See generally Richard H. Pildes &
Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, "Bizarre Districts," and Voting Rights: Evaluating
Election-District Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 483 (1993)
(discussing the expressive harm inflicted by bizarre districts drawn predominantly based
on race).
32. See Gray, 372 U.S. at 380 ("Every voter's vote is entitled to be counted once. It
must be correctly counted and reported.... '[T]he right to have one's vote counted' has
the same dignity as 'the right to put a ballot in a box.' It can be protected from the
diluting effect of illegal ballots."). The Court also wrote:
[O]nce the class of voters is chosen... we see no constitutional way by which
equality of voting power may be evaded .... The conception of political equality
from the Declaration of Independence, to Lincoln's Gettysburg Address, to the
Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and Nineteenth Amendments can mean only one thing-
one person, one vote.
Id. at 381. Many might be surprised to learn that the phrase "one person, one vote" comes
from the lesser-known Gray v. Sanders, rather than the more prominent Baker or
Reynolds (where it is later repeated).
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level of representation or policy-making 3
As we will show below, a lot of assumptions underlie the Court's
"equality equation": one person plus one vote = equal influence. But
for now it might be worth analyzing exactly what the Court means by
an equally weighted vote. It cannot mean, for example, that each
citizen has a right to equal influence over the political process34 or
even that each voter has a right to an equal chance to have his or her
preferred candidate elected.3 1 If one were to formalize the formula
for equal influence, the Court's opinion implies it would be this: each
citizen ought to have the equal probability of casting a tie-breaking
vote regardless of the location of his or her residence, all other things
being equal.3 6  In other words, the chief evil of malapportioned
33. See Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 562-63; see also Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 416
(1977) ("The Equal Protection Clause requires that legislative districts be of nearly equal
population, so that each person's vote may be given equal weight in the election of
representatives."); Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 182, 185 (1971) ("It is well established that
electoral apportionment must be based on the general principle of population equality and
that this principle applies to state and local elections .... "); Avery v. Midland County, 390
U.S. 474, 478 (1968) ("Every qualified resident ... has the right to a ballot for election of
state legislators of equal weight to the vote of every other resident, and that right is
infringed when legislators are elected from districts of substantially unequal population.");
Roman v. Sincock, 377 U.S. 695,708 (1964) ("[T]he Equal Protection Clause requires that
seats in both houses of a bicameral state legislature must be apportioned substantially on a
population basis.").
34. A wealthy campaign contributor or powerful party aparatchik will always have
more influence than a simple voter with one vote, for example.
35. The votes of Republicans in the South Bronx or Democrats in parts of the Bible
Belt are almost worthless in their respective legislative districts, for all practical purposes.
36. Professor Banzhaf articulated a similar formula that has been frequently used in
voting rights cases. See John F. Banzhaf III, Multi-Member Electoral Districts-Do They
Violate the 'One Man, One Vote' Principle, 75 YALE L.J. 1309, 1319-24 (1966); John F.
Banzhaf III, One Man, 3.312 Votes: A Mathematical Analysis of the Electoral College, 13
VILL. L. REV. 304,312-18 (1968); John F. Banzhaf III, Weighted Voting Doesn't Work" A
Mathematical Analysis, 19 RUTGERS L. REv. 317, 322-35 (1965). However, the Supreme
Court has rejected the "Banzhaf index" on two occasions. See Bd. of Estimate v. Morris,
489 U.S. 688, 697-99 (1989); Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 145 (1971). Whitcomb
rejected the Banzhaf index precisely because it held all things equal in the assessment of
voting power: the index did not account for "any political or other factors which might
affect the actual voting power of the residents, which might include party affiliation, race,
previous voting characteristics or any other factors which go into the entire political voting
situation." 403 U.S. at 145-46. It should be noted that the Court in Whitcomb did not
define "equally effective voice" in terms of the probability of casting a dispositive-or tie-
breaking-vote in an election. In Whitcomb, the Court rejected a hypothesis that claimed
that voters in multi-member districts enjoyed a better chance of casting a tie-breaking vote
in an election than their counterparts in single-member districts. The Court in Whitcomb
did little more than dismiss the hypothesis as "theoretical." See id. at 145. In doing so, the
Court permitted systems with varying numbers of representatives notwithstanding the
possibility that some members of the populace enjoyed more of an opportunity to cast the
dispositive ballot in a given election. In the end, the Court fell back on the still-undefined
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districts is that some voters in some districts could have a greater
chance of casting the dispositive vote in the election of their
representative.3 7 This formulation seems to drain the opinions of
their romantic democratic quality, but this provides an explanation
for what the Court means by an "equally effective voice," a concept
left asserted and undefined to this day.
If we understand equal influence in this way, we can better
understand the Court's critical analogies between malapportionment
and what might be called "double voting"-the awarding of different
numbers of votes to different people. At times the Reynolds opinion
reduces to a seductive set of syllogisms. The right to vote entails
more than simply casting a ballot into thin air. It involves having that
ballot counted-and counted equally with those of other voters.
Surely, for example, the right to vote implies that the state cannot
stuff ballot boxes so as to make your vote meaningless. Likewise, it
prevents the government from assigning more votes to some people
based, for example, on the fortuity of where they live. If that's true-
that the government cannot give your neighbor two votes for your
one-then surely the right to vote means that the government cannot
place you in a more populous district such that your vote has half the
weight of the voter on the other side of the district line.
Double voting and malapportionment are similar because in both
cases two similarly situated individuals are given differential power to
cast the tie-breaking vote in an election. The person with two votes
can cast the decisive votes in an election if his preferred candidate is
tied or just one vote behind the leader, whereas the voter with a
single vote will only be able to cast the dispositive vote if both
candidates are tied. The situation is somewhat similar to
malapportionment. All other things being equal, a voter in a less
populated district is more likely to cast the dispositive vote in her
district's election than would her neighbor over the district line who
lives in a more populated district. In other words, a voter's chance of
affecting the outcome of an election decreases as the district's
population increases (all other things being equal). Think of it this
way, would you be more likely to cast the tie-breaking vote in an
election for homeroom representative or in an election for governor?
concept, first put forth by the Reynolds Court as its test for unconstitutional vote dilution:
"[f]ull and effective participation by all citizens in state government requires... that each
citizen have an equally effective voice in the election of members of his state legislature."
Id. at 141 (quoting Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 565) (emphasis added).
37. For a discussion by the Supreme Court regarding the mathematics of tie-breaking
votes in multi-member districts, see Whitcomb, 403 U.S. at 144-48.
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And if it is true that your chance of affecting an election's outcome
will vary based on the population size of the electorate, then how can
the state justify putting you in a worse position than your neighbor
with regard to your chance to effect your favored outcome?
The central problem with this formulaic rationale for the one-
person, one-vote rule comes from the phrase "all other things being
equal," of course. Only if we control for all other political variables
does population size become the dispositive factor in assessing a
voter's political influence and the effectiveness of her voice. Once the
model becomes more complex and realistic, it falls apart, and, as the
Court itself has held, becomes impossible to operationalize 5 For if
the one-person, one-vote rule really means "equal voice," "equal
influence," or an "equally weighted vote," it would require much
more than equal numbers of people in each district. It would require
that each district be equally competitive-that is, safe districts, where
one party's nominee is assured the election, would seem to fall victim
to the rule of equal weighting of votes. It would prevent partisan
gerrymandering or other types of political or race-based vote dilution,
where one group has less of an opportunity than others to elect its
candidate of choice.39
The point of this somewhat tangential discussion is to show that
one must look beyond the equality rationale to justify the one-person,
one-vote rule.4 The notion of equal voting power underlying one
person, one vote, if taken to its logical conclusion, should have led the
Court into much thicker thickets of regulating inequalities in political
influence. Two reasons might explain the Court's reluctance to
38. See id, 403 U.S. at 145-46.
39. Professor Heather Gerken's contribution to this Symposium makes a similar
argument in greater detail. Heather K. Gerken, The Costs and Causes of Minimalism in
Voting Cases: Baker v. Carr and its Progeny, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1411 (2002) (suggesting the
Court missed an opportunity in Baker to provide clear principles to enforce guarantees of
political equality); see generally Heather K. Gerken, Understanding the Right to an
Undiluted Vote, 114 HARv. L. REV. 1663 (2001) (discussing theory of vote dilution).
40. Of course, there are other ways of estimating the discrimination caused by
malapportionment. One could focus on the reduced face time and attention that a given
voter in a more populous district receives-for example, a voter in Delaware, one might
argue, is more likely to meet and communicate with her senator than a voter in California
or New York. Similarly, from the representative's standpoint, the "casework" required
for a district would seem to vary according to a district's population-to take the same
example, a senator from Delaware is more likely to be able to look into the problems of a
disgruntled social security recipient in his state than would a New York or California
senator in hers. Malapportionment misallocates legislative burdens, under this view, as
well as electoral opportunities. These unarticulated justifications for one person, one vote,
however, are not the principal egalitarian rationales that emerged in the opinion or the
proceduralist ones that emerged in the post-Baker literature.
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address many of these other topics of political inequality. First,
malapportionment is much more amenable to judicially manageable
standards. As John Hart Ely described the one-person, one-vote rule,
"administrability is its long suit, and the more troublesome question is
what else it has to recommend it."'" Standards of equally sized
districts are much easier to administer than would be similar ones that
might be needed to regulate partisan gerrymandering, for example.
Second, the one-person, one-vote decisions are about more than
unequal influence; they are about remedying defects in the political
process. The chief democratic defects that the one-person, one-vote
decisions targeted and to which we now turn our attention are process
failures concerning competition and representation.
B. Malapportionment as Distortion of the Political Market
Although talk of "equal rights" may occupy more space in the
one-person, one-vote cases, the "process failure" arguments have
dominated the related legal debates since the 1960s. The first family
of these arguments focuses on the value of competition for the
political system. By allowing those with power to rig the rules of the
electoral system to keep themselves in office, the argument goes,
malapportionment undermined political competition, a bedrock value
for a healthy democracy.42  Without the constraint of equal
population, linedrawers could follow Elbridge Gerry's example and
freely draw lines around all of the opposition's supporters, awarding
them just a few seats, while drawing smaller districts around voters
more likely to elect members allegiant to the dominant party.
Competition, or lack thereof, comes in many forms in our
electoral and political system, however. Not only does a rich variety
of elections exist (that is, federal, state and local; and executive,
legislative, and in some states, judicial) such that it is difficult to assess
the competitiveness of an electoral system in toto, but even when we
isolate the relevant candidate race, political scientists will differ as to
when it becomes "competitive." If incumbents are frequently
defeated, for example, but the party controlling the legislature never
changes, would one call that a competitive state? Or what if most
seats in the legislature are "safe" (that is, where one or the other
party's nominee is guaranteed to win by a large margin), but a critical
few are up for grabs and could determine control of the legislature?
41. ELY, supra note 9, at 121.
42. See Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 754 n.13 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring)
(explaining potential for competition-inhibiting gerrymanders).
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The move from malapportionment to one person, one vote may have
traded one type of non-competitive electoral system for another. But
before assessing the damage, it might be helpful to identify the points
in the political and electoral system where competition may "matter"
and where malapportionment may have an impact.
At the micro level, one would focus on the competitiveness of
any given legislative race: is a particular election in a particular
legislative district competitive or not? The existence of multiple (or
at least more than one) candidates on the ballot may be a necessary,
but hardly sufficient, characteristic of a competitive electoral system.
An election that forces a choice between Al Gore, Ralph Nader, and
Pat Buchanan, for example, is hardly a competitive race, despite three
possible choices. Although competition implies some "choice," the
number of choices does not bear directly on the competitiveness of
the race if the winner of the election is, for all practical purposes,
preordained. The "preordination" of an election is really what makes
it non-competitive, but that phenomenon turns out to be a very tricky
one to describe and to measure. Ultimately, the competitiveness of
an election depends on whether one candidate or party has a much
greater chance of winning than does its opponent. In many cases, it
turns on the strength of incumbency and the probability that a
"quality" challenger will emerge.
Political competition, like pornography, may be something
difficult to define but something we know when we see it. There are
two ways of "seeing" competition: one looks at competitive
conditions ex ante and another examines the results of the election ex
post. Before an election, if one knew nothing else about a district
except the partisanship of its constituents, a "competitive" district
would be one with an equal number of Democrats and Republicans,
the logic being that neither party's nominee then has a better chance
(all other things being equal) of winning. The party affiliation of
district residents is only a rough estimate of how they will vote
between two hypothetical candidates, of course. What we really want
to know is the chance that the electorate will be equally divided
between two candidates once the votes are cast. That "chance" will
depend on a number of factors in addition to the partisan balance in
the district: the presence or absence of an incumbent running for re-
election, the "quality" of the challenger, the level of campaign
spending by each candidate, the national partisan swing during the
election, the differential rates of turnout of each candidate's
supporters, and many other idiosyncratic "campaign" effects.
Because a competitive election is hard to predict in the abstract,
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those who study legislative elections often examine electoral results
to determine a district's competitiveness. 43 Most analysts use the
margin of victory in the race to separate competitive from
noncompetitive districts. Experts will differ as to the size of the
margin that indicates competitiveness (5%, 4 10%.45 or 20%46), and
any threshold is inherently arbitrary. To repeat, the numbers are
used merely as a proxy for a determination of whether the loser had a
good chance of winning. Moreover, numbers from one election may
not be reliable in assessing the competitiveness of the district,
generally, or of even the next election, in particular.47
When assessing the impact of malapportionment on individual,
district-level competitiveness, those concerned with political
competition focus on the ability of those who draw the lines to
preordain electoral outcomes. Most often, this concern translates
into an analysis of the electoral advantage conferred upon
incumbents by the redistricting process: did the one-person, one-vote
rule lead to a greater number of seats where incumbents were in
danger of losing? This question is really just one example of the
larger question: was it more or less difficult after Baker for those who
drew district lines to draw them in such a way as to preordain the
victor in the race? That victor might be a particular individual (for
example, a particular incumbent) or a class of individuals (for
example, potential candidates of one political party).
Individual, district-level effects were not the principal concern of
the process-school that supported the shift to one person, one vote.
Malapportionment presented a problem for the democratic system
not principally because any given district was non-competitive, but
because the legislature as a whole was dominated by a faction
(usually party) whose re-election was perpetually reassured. Thus,
competition for control of the legislature was the type of competition
43. See GARY C. JACOBSON, THE POLITICS OF CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS 142-46
(2001); THOMAS E. MANN, UNSAFE AT ANY MARGIN: INTERPRETING CONGRESSIONAL
ELECTIONS 81-99 (1977); John A. Ferejohn, On the Decline of Competition in
Congressional Elections, 71 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 166, 175 (1977); David R. Mayhew,
Congressional Elections: The Case of the Vanishing Marginals, 6 POLITY 295, 296-97
(1974); Edward R. Tufte, The Relationship Between Seats and Votes in Two-Party Systems,
67 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 540,540 (1973).
44. See Mayhew, supra note 43, at 297.
45. See GARY W. COX & JONATHAN N. KATZ, ELBRIDGE GERRY'S SALAMANDER:
THE ELECTORAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE REAPPORTIONMENT REVOLUTION (2002).
46. See Ferejohn, supra note 43, at 166 n.1.
47. See MANN, supra note 43, at 81-99; Gary C. Jacobson, The Marginals Never
Vanished: Incumbency and Competition in Elections to the U.S. House of Representatives,
1952-82,31 AM. J. POL. SCI. 126, 133 (1987).
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that generated the greatest concern both on the Court and from
subsequent legal analysts because it was thought to be most
susceptible of manipulation by the majority party in the legislature.
Control of a legislature and of the redistricting process depends on
which party has a majority of legislative seats. Because the legislative
majority usually must approve a new districting plan, drawing lines so
as to maintain majority status is the key to calcifying the political
process to ensure no political change can take place. One person, one
vote would help prevent partisan gerrymandering, one might have
thought, because linedrawers would be less able to overrepresent
their constituencies and underrepresent those of their opponents.
Thus, we would expect legislative turnover-the changing of the
guard in control of a state legislature-to be more frequent once the
Court stepped in and enacted the one-person, one-vote rule. We test
this hypothesis in Part IV of this Article.48
C. Malapportionment and [Misirepresentation
Because malapportionment allowed those in power to draw
districts to favor some candidates and parties over others, it naturally
favored some "interests" and "constituencies" over others.49
Malapportionment, some argued, served to skew representation in
favor of those groups that constituted a small share of the population
but controlled a larger number of seats in the legislature. Because
districts were often drawn according to county lines, rural voters (and
the party of which they were members) in less populated counties
were thought to be overrepresented in the legislatures at the expense
of voters in cities and suburbs. 0 Such malapportionment creates
representational "harm" when voters in less populated districts have
different interests or preferences than those in overpopulated
districts. Thus, one group has a louder "voice" in the legislature
despite the fact that it has fewer numbers in the population.
Representation, like competition, means different things to
different people, and what constitutes "accurate" representation is
48. See infra notes 90-106 and accompanying text.
49. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 567 n.43 (1964) ("[W]hile currently the thrust
of state legislative malapportionment results, in most States, in underrepresentation of
urban and suburban areas, in earlier times cities were in fact overrepresented in a number
of States."); see also Moody v. Flowers, 387 U.S. 97, 102 (1967) (suggesting that
malapportionment might lead to a pattern of misrepresentation); WMCA, Inc. v.
Lomenzo, 377 U.S. 633, 636 (1964) (noting the existence of a "grossly unfair weighting of
both houses in the State legislature in favor of the lesser populated rural areas of the state
to the great disadvantage of the densely populated urban centers of the state").
50. See, e.g., Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 567 n.43; WMCA, 377 U.S. at 636.
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among the most hotly debated topics in political philosophy.5 One
metric often used to measure representational distortion is the
minimum percentage of the population needed to win a majority of
the seats in the legislature. Thus, in a three-person legislature where
two districts represent populations of ten people but a third contains
eighty people, a party could win the two small districts (representing
20% of the population) but still have a majority of the seats. We
present such a measurement of misrepresentation for all fifty states
before Baker v. Carr in Table 1.
Those who study the political effects of redistricting 2 have
isolated two distinct ideas implicit in the debate over
malapportionment and misrepresention: partisan bias and electoral
responsiveness. Partisan bias is the "the degree to which an electoral
system unfairly favors one political party in the translation of
statewide (or nationwide) votes into the partisan division of the
legislature."'53 Roughly speaking, if a state's Republicans win 50% of
the votes in a legislative election statewide but win 55% of the seats,
the districting plan exhibits a pro-Republican bias of 5%. Electoral
responsiveness refers to a similar concept. Gelman and King describe
it as the "degree to which the partisan composition of the legislature
responds to changes in voter preferences."55 It can be measured by
finding "the expected seat proportion given a small change in the vote
proportion. '56  Thus, an electoral system that translates a 2%
51. See generally HANNA PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION (1967)
(presenting alternative views and definitions for representation); LANI GUINIER,
TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY (1994) (discussing issues of race and representation).
52. See Andrew Gelman & Gary King, Enhancing Democracy Through Legislative
Redistricting, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 541, 542-43 (1994).
53. Id. at 543.
54. Estimating bias turns out to be a complicated enterprise because under plurality
voting systems with single-member districts, even without gerrymandering, the proportion
of seats a party wins is ordinarily greater than the proportion of votes it receives. To say a
particular array of districts is "biased" assumes the existence of a baseline map without
such a bias. But no such politically "neutral" map exists to compare against the biased one
that was drawn. One must then surmise a natural level of bias in the system and estimate
the difference between that bias and the one that actually occurs. The complexity is not
relevant for our present purposes, however. For a more in-depth discussion of these
issues, see Gelman & King, supra note 52; Gary King & Robert X. Browning, Democratic
Representation and Partisan Bias in Congressional Elections, 81 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1251
(1987); Gary King & Andrew Gelman, Systemic Consequences of Incumbency Advantage
in U.S. House Elections, 35 AM. J. POL. SCI. 110 (1991).
55. Gelman & King, supra note 52, at 542.
56. Other measures of responsiveness can be found in Stephen Ansolabehere et al.,
The Vanishing Marginals and Electoral Responsiveness, 22 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 21 (1992);
M.G. Kendall & A. Stuart, The Law of the Cubic Proportions in Electoral Results, 1 BRIT.
J. Soc. 183 (1950); Richard G. Niemi & Patrick Fett, The Swing Ratio: An Explanation
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TABLE 1: State Apportionment Prior to Baker v. Carr
Last Two Minimum Vote Need to
State Apportioments Control in 1962
Before 1960 Senate House
Alabama 1901, 1880 25.1% 25.7%
Alaska 1956, 1953 35.0 49.0
Arizona 1958, 1956 12.8 N/A
Arkansas 1951, 1941 43.8 33.3
California 1951, 1941 10.7 44.7
Colorado 1953, 1933 29.8 32.1
Connecticut 1876-H, 1941-S 33.4 12.0
Delaware 1897 22.0 18.5
Florida 1955-H, 1945 12.0 12.0
Georgia 1950, 1940 22.6 22.2
Hawaii 1959, 1958 23.4 47.8
Idaho 1951, 1941 16.6 32.7
Illinois 1955, 1901 28.7 39.9
Indiana 1921, 1915 40.4 34.8
Iowa 1927-H, 1911-S 35.2 26.9
Kansas 1959-H, 1947-S 26.8 18.5
Kentucky 1942, 1918 42.0 34.1
Louisiana 1921, 1902 33.0 44.1
Maine 1955-H, 1951-S 46.9 39.7
Maryland 1943 14.2 25.3
Massachusetts 1947-H, 1948-S 44.6 45.3
Michigan 1953, 1943 29.0 44.0
Minnesota 1959, 1913 40.1 34.5
Mississippi 1916, 1904 34.6 29.1
Missouri 1951, 1946 47.7 20.3
Montana 1943, 1939 16.1 36.6
Nebraska 1935, 1920 36.6 Unicameral
Nevada 1951, 1947 8.0 35.0
New Hampshire 1951-H, 1915-S 45.3 43.9
New Jersey 1941, 1931 19.0 46.5
New Mexico 1955, 1949 14.0 27.0
New York 1954, 1944 41.4 33.4
North Carolina 1941, 1921 36.9 27.1
North Dakota 1931, 1921 31.9 40.2
Ohio 1957, 1953 41.0 30.3
Oklahoma 1951, 1941 24.5 29.5
Oregon 1954, 1911 47.8 48.1
Pennsylvania 1953, 1921 33.1 37.7
Rhode Island 1940, 1930 18.1 46.5
South Carolina 1952, 1942 23.3 46.0
South Dakota 1951, 1947 38.3 38.5
Tennessee 1901 26.9 28.7
and an Assessment, 11 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 75 (1986); Tufte, supra note 43.
1319
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
TABLE 1-Continued
Last Two Minimum Vote Needed to
State Apportioments Control in 1962
Before 1960 Senate House
Texas 1951, 1921 30.3 38.6
Utah 1955, 1931 21.3 33.3
Vermont 1793 47.0 11.6
Virginia 1958, 1952 37.7 36.8
Washington 1957, 1931 33.9 35.3
West Virginia 1950, 1940 46.7 40.0
Wisconsin 1951, 1921 45.0 40.0
Wyoming 1931, 1921 26.9 35.8
Average 30.8% 34.0%
Notes: Basis of apportionment taken from The Book of the States, 1962-1963, Volume 14. (Chicago, IL The Council of State Govern.
tents, 1963). Minimum vote needed to control house taken from Apportionment in the Nineteen sixties. (New York. National Munici-
pal League, 1967). Dates of previous apportionments taken from The Book of the States, 1960-1961 Volume 13. (Chicago, IL: The
Council of State Governments).
Republican gain in the statewide vote into a 2% gain in seats is more
responsive than an electoral system that only gives the Republicans a
1% gain in seats5 7 Measures of responsiveness therefore indicate the
ability of the electoral system to translate changes in voting patterns
into changes in legislative seat allocation. Bias indicates the
propensity of the electoral system "to get it right"-that is, to
translate vote shares into seat shares.
Nothing in these concepts limits them to party affiliation, of
course. One could just as easily examine whether an electoral system
is biased in favor of rural interests or members of a particular racial
or ethnic group. Any electorate can be cut in an infinite number of
ways; the process of line-drawing could overrepresent any kind of
interest over another.
Before moving to what political scientists have said on these
subjects, we should note the tension between competition and
representation in the process of drawing district lines. Advocates for
57. Electoral responsiveness turns out to be a pretty complicated concept when used
to evaluate different electoral systems. Most would agree that some change in vote share
should be reflected in some change in seat share, but it is not abundantly clear that there
should be a direct relationship (that is, a perfectly responsive system would not necessarily
translate every 1% change in vote share into a 1% change in share of seats). Political
scientists often refer to the "cube rule" as a description of electoral responsiveness. That
rule provides that a party's gain in seat share should be the cube of its gain in vote share.
See sources cited in supra notes 54-56. Professor Schotland faults us for concentrating on
bias and ignoring responsiveness in the empirical work we present later in this Article. To
properly assess responsiveness we would need to embark on a lengthy, mathematically
rich discussion that space considerations and our assessment of audience interest prevent.
We would refer those who savor the calculus involved to the sources cited in this
subsection. See supra note 54-56.
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"electoral reform" often overlook this important fact.58 It is almost
impossible to design a system of districts that maximizes both
representation and competitiveness. Assume, for example, that one
wishes to maximize district-level competition. It can be easily done:
just draw districts so that each one has about 50% Democrats and
50% Republicans. Now that all districts are "competitive," what
happens when 1% of the electorate shifts its preferences or has
greater turnout, as happens, for example, when a popular presidential
winner has long coattails? The result: each district narrowly elects a
candidate from the same party, producing a highly unrepresentative
legislature where one party wins 100% of the seats with a mere 51%
of the vote per district.
Consider the other worst-case scenario-the so-called
"bipartisan" or incumbent-protecting gerrymander. Under those
types of schemes, incumbent Democrats and Republicans divide up
the electorate into safe Democratic and safe Republican districts.
The result: the legislature that emerges is quite representative
(perhaps even close to proportional representation) but each election
is non-competitive. More voters are "happy" with their
representative (that is, the winning candidate wins by a lot), but the
winner is preordained, to a large extent.59
These types of tradeoffs often infect decisions of electoral
institutional design. Criticisms of the current system (for example,
that "elections mean little because the decision is already made" or
''we want a legislature that is responsive to the people") often run
counter to each other.
I. BAKER'S EFFECr ON ELECTORAL COMPETITION:
MALAPPORTIONMENT, THE VANISHING MARGINALS, AND THE
INCUMBENCY ADVANTAGE
For those who viewed static district lines in the face of shifting
populations as a hindrance to electoral competition at the district
level, the one-person, one-vote rule offered some hope that with a
58. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, In Real Elections, There Ought To Be Competition,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16,2002, at A19.
59. The Court has all but sanctioned bipartisan gerrymanders that aim for
proportional representation-like results. For instance, in Gaffney v. Cummings, a
Connecticut redistricting plan provided for "70 safe Democratic seats, 55 to 60 safe
Republican seats, with the balance characterized as probable or swing Democratic or
Republican or 'just plain swing,'" 412 U.S. 735, 738 n.4 (1973), thus providing for "what
was thought to be a proportionate number of Republican and Democratic legislative
seats." Id. at 738. The Court upheld the plan notwithstanding the existence of a clear
bipartisan gerrymander. See id at 735-36, 740-41.
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new constitutional rule would come a more vibrant political market.
One plausible hypothesis was that a move to equipopulous decennial
districting would threaten individual legislators reliant on predictable
constituencies and comfortable with calcified district lines. The first
wave of empirical studies on the political effects of Baker and
Reynolds suggested this hypothesis was wrong.
In fact, early observers found that, if anything, the
reapportionment decisions added to the advantages of incumbency,
rather than detracting from them. After noting that only about 13%
of House races were competitive in 1970 as compared to 21% in 1950,
Edward Tufte blamed redistricting:
[A] major element in the job security of incumbents is their
ability to exert significant control over the drawing of
district boundaries .... It is hardly surprising that
legislators, like businessmen, collaborate with their nominal
adversaries to eliminate dangerous competition. Ironically,
reapportionment rulings have given incumbents new
opportunities to construct secure districts for themselves,
leading to a reduction in turnover ....
Many states, through recent reapportionments, have
practically eliminated political competition for congressional
seats-even compared to the relatively small proportion of
competitive seats in the past.
The independent contribution of reapportionment to the job
security of incumbents can also be seen directly in... an
immediate decline in the competitiveness of the races in the
first election after the new districting.6°
For the period immediately following Baker and Reynolds, Tufte
and others6' found that the Supreme Court's one-person, one-vote
60. Tufte, supra note 43, at 550-53; see also John F. Gallagher & Louis F. Weschler,
California, in IMPACr OF REAPPORTIONMENT ON THE THIRTEEN WESTERN STATES 86
(Eleanore Bushnell ed., 1970) (finding no material effect on incumbent "political
fortunes") [hereinafter IMPACT OF REAPPORTIONMENT]; Robert S. Erikson,
Malapportionment, Gerrymandering, and Party Fortunes in Congressional Elections, 66
AM. POL. Sci. RV. 1234, 1234 (1972) (examining partisan distribution of northern
congressional seats) [hereinafter Erikson, Congressional Elections]; Robert S. Erikson,
The Partisan Impact of State Legislative Reapportionment, 15 MIDWEST J. POL. Sci. 57, 57
(1971) (finding that the move to equipopulous districting benefited Democrats)
[hereinafter Erikson, Partisan Impact].
61. See, e.g., Albert D. Cover & David R. Mayhew, Congressional Dynamics and the
Decline of Competitive Congressional Elections, in CONGRESS RECONSIDERED 62-82
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rule, far from destabilizing incumbency and leading to more vibrant
electoral competition, either helped House incumbents win more
convincingly or at least did nothing to stand in their way. Before
1966, 61% of House incumbents would beat their opponents by
twenty points or more, but by 1972 the figure had jumped to
approximately 78%.62 Although the 1974 election with its fallout
from Watergate saw a small drop in incumbents' margin of victory, in
every election since then about 70% of incumbents win by twenty
points or more. Similar research revealed comparable trends in state
legislative races.63
This early literature recognizing "the vanishing marginals" (that
is, disappearance of competitive districts) was succeeded by more
methodologically sophisticated inquires that complicated the idea of
an incumbency advantage, and cast serious doubt on redistricting as
the primary culprit. All agreed that incumbents were winning by
bigger margins, but many disagreed that redistricting was to blame or
that margins of victory were the proper measure of incumbents'
security. If redistricting under the new rules was to blame for the
vanishing marginals, then one would have expected the following:
incumbent safety should have spiked after 1964 relative to earlier
decades, incumbents whose districts were not redrawn would have
been less secure than those with redrawn districts, and Senate
incumbents would not have experienced a similar incumbency
advantage given that they were not subject to redistricting. None of
these expected phenomena appear to have occurred.
First, scholars point out that the number of marginal districts
began to decline much earlier, in 1896 or 1932, not in 1966. 4 In 1932,
(Lawrence C. Dodd & Bruce I. Oppenheimer eds., 2d ed. 1981); Richard Born,
Generational Replacement and the Growth of Incumbent Reelection Margins in the U.S.
House, 73 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 811, 811 (1979); Charles S. Bullock III, Redistricting and
Congressional Stability, 37 J. POL. 569, 575 (1975); Erikson, Congressional Elections, supra
note 60; James L. Payne, The Personal Electoral Advantage of House Incumbents, 1936-
1976,8 AM. POL. Q. 465,465 (1980).
62. See JACOBSON, supra note 43, at 27.
63. See MALCOLM E. JEWELL, REPRESENTATION IN STATE LEGISLATURES 46-48
(1982); Jerry Calvert, Revolving Doors: Volunteerism in State Legislatures, 52 ST. GOV'T
174, 175 (1979); Malcolm E. Jewell & David Breaux, The Effect of Incumbency on State
Legislative Elections, 13 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 495, 495 (1988); David Ray & John Havick, A
Longitudinal Analysis of Party Competition in State Legislative Elections, 25 AM. J. POL.
SCI. 119, 119 (1981); Charles M. Tidmarch et al., Interparty Competition in the U.S. States:
Legislative Elections, 1970-1978,11 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 353,361-62 (1986); Ronald E. Weber
et al., Vanishing Marginals in State Legislative Elections, 16 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 29,29 (1991).
64. See WALTER DEAN BURNHAM, CRITICAL ELECTIONS AND THE MAINSPRINGS
OF AMERICAN POLITICS passim (1970); James C. Garand & Donald A. Gross, Changes in
the Vote Margins for Congressional Candidates: A Specification of Historical Trends, 78
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for example, only about a third of congressional elections were
noncompetitive (that is, where the victor won 60% or more of the
vote), but in 1960 (even before Baker) a little more than half were.65
By 1946, when most scholars begin their analysis of the post-war
period, about 60% of incumbents were in "safe" districts, a figure that
grew to 75% in the late sixties, around which it has fluctuated for the
next thirty years. Thus, however suggestive the before-and-after
photos of district marginality in 1964 may be, a longer-term view
reveals a drop in marginality that began much earlier. The number of
marginal districts declined somewhat abruptly in the mid-sixties, but
the downward trend began much earlier. So the redistricting
decisions, while certainly not preventing the decline in the number of
marginal districts, could hardly have caused the trend.
Second, if redistricting "caused" the alleged increase in
incumbent safety, then one might have expected incumbents in
redrawn districts to win reelection more easily than incumbents in
nonredrawn districts. John Ferejohn demonstrated the absence of
this phenomenon as well.66 To be sure, those states that redrew their
districts experienced a large drop in the number of competitive
districts, from about 51% in 1962 to 27% in 1970. But states that did
not redistrict experienced a near equal drop from 51% in 1962 to 33%
in 1970.67 Something else-besides redistricting-appeared to have
been going on around the time of one person, one vote that led to
greater victory margins for incumbents.
Finally, the rise of incumbent security in Senate races at the same
time as in the House casted doubt on the redistricting hypothesis. s
Those who have estimated the incumbency effect find an increase in
the 1960s that even exceeds that in the House. One scholar found
that by 1970 Senate incumbents beat their opponents by an average
of eleven percentage points-up from four percentage points in
1950.69 Given that Senate districts-that is, states-do not undergo
AM. POL. ScI. REv. 17,20 (1984).
65. Donald A. Gross & James C. Garand, The Vanishing Marginals: 1824-1980, 46 J.
POL. 224,227-28 (1984).
66. Ferejohn, supra note 43, at 167; see also Bullock, supra note 61, at 575; Albert D.
Cover, One Good Term Deserves Another: The Advantage of Incumbency in
Congressional Elections, 21 AM. J. POL. SCI. 523, 523 (1977).
67. Cox and Katz suggest that Ferejohn underestimated the severity of the drop in
marginality in newly drawn districts, although they agree that both redrawn and
unchanged districts showed some drop in marginality. See COX & KATZ, supra note 45.
68. Warren Lee Kostroski, Party and Incumbency in Postwar Senate Elections:
Trends, Patterns and Models, 67 AM. POL. SCI. REv. 1213, 1213 (1973).
69. See id.
[Vol. 801324
2002] COMPETITION & REPRESENTATION 1325
redistricting, a rise in incumbency advantage in the Senate paralleling
that in the House (as depicted in Figure 1) suggests that the changing
importance of incumbency, rather than the new practice of line-
drawing, was responsible for increasing incumbent safety.7° A host of
alternative explanations-such as the decline of strong party
identification and the rise of a personal vote, the increase in
casework, pork-barreling and credit-claiming by incumbents, the rise
in resources available to officeholders, and the disappearance of
quality challengers-seems to provide a better explanation for the
incumbency advantage.71
FIGURE 1: Percentage of Incumbents Reelected
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Source: GARY C. JACOBSON, THE POLITCS OF CONGRE-SSIONAL ELECTIONS
TIbls. 3-1. 3-2 (5th ed. 2001).
It should be noted, however, that not everyone even agrees that
incumbents have been getting safer. It may be true that they are
winning by bigger margins than ever-or at least since 1960. But
while the marginals may have vanished, incumbents may not be safer.
Just because incumbents tend, on average, to beat their opponents
ever more handily does not mean that a given incumbent, after
winning a huge victory, is necessarily more secure that he can do it
again next time. As Tom Mann put it in the title of his book,
70. See Benjamin Highton, Senate Elections in the United States, 1920-94, 30 BRIT. J.
POL. Sci. 483, 505-06 (20030); Michael Krashinsky & William J. Milne, The Effects of
Incumbency in U.S. Congressional Elections, 1950-1988, 18 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 321, 321
(1993).
71. See JACOBSON, supra note 43, at 30-40.
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sometimes incumbents feel "Unsafe at Any Margin."72 In fact, Gary
Jacobson has argued that incumbents are even less safe today than
they were previously despite the fact that when they win, they do so
by much larger margins than ever before.73 Interelection vote swings
have gotten larger, he argues, so an incumbent's vote share in one
election is a less reliable predictor (than previously) of his likely vote
share in the next election. Do not confuse incumbent safety with low
average rates of competitiveness, the argument goes, because a safe
seat in one election could be vulnerable in the next.
At the highest level of complexity are the arguments that
redistricting actually increased competitiveness somewhat because it
introduced randomness, partisan gerrymandering and a certain
rhythm to quality challenger entry and incumbent exit.74 Those
making such arguments focus on two developments introduced by
decennial redistricting: (1) the mere fact that the district map is now,
in a sense, shuffled every ten years; and (2) that challengers will time
their entry and incumbents will time their exit to coincide with the
redistricting cycle. Although it is true that before 1962, parties in
control of legislatures could target their opponents for elimination,
the practice became routinized once the Court mandated decennial
redistricting. The result is not only that some incumbents lose in seats
newly made unsafe, but also that many simply exit once they see their
heads on the chopping block. Even those who are not targeted may
have their districts redrawn such that the incumbents feel it might be
harder to win and now would be a good time to exit. Correlatively,
quality challengers now bide their time until the next redistricting
cycle-waiting to see where and when they would most likely get
elected. This explanation of the rhythmic effect of decennial
redistricting on incumbent exit and challenger entry has won over
many, but certainly not all,75 who study the incumbency advantage.
72. See MANN, supra note 43, at 1-9; see also JACOBSON, supra note 43, at 35-36
(noting the "electoral value" of the incumbent advantage is "clearly not a constant");
Jacobson, supra note 47.
73. See JACOBSON, supra note 43, at 48; Jacobson, supra note 47, at 126 ("Vote
margins increased without adding to incumbent security... because the heterogeneity of
interelection vote swings increased at the same time.").
74. See Cox & KATZ, supra note 45 (manuscript at chs. 8-9); Stephen Ansolabehere
& Alan Gerber, Incumbency Advantage and the Persistence of Legislative Majorities, 22
LEGIS. STUD. Q. 161, 166-67 (1997); Gary W. Cox & Jonathan N. Katz, Why Did the
Incumbency Advantage in U.S. House Elections Grow?, 40 AM. J. POL. SCI. 478, 492
(1996); Jacobson, supra note 47, at 128.
75. See, e.g., Monica Bauer & John R. Hibbing, Which Incumbents Lose in House
Elections: A Response to Jacobson's "The Marginals Never Vanished," 33 AM. J. POL. SC.
262,262 (1989).
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Given the increase since 1964 of the incumbency advantage,
however one defines it and however one controls for other variables,
even those who see some pro-competitive effect from redistricting see
only a modest one. From all these studies of the incumbency
advantage emerges the tenable proposition that redistricting under
the one-person, one-vote rule either reinforced the power of
incumbents or did not prevent them from using other advantages of
office to strangle competition out of the electoral process. Although
quite disappointing news for those who saw in Baker and its progeny
a hope for a competitive political market, perhaps the rise in
incumbent advantages would be offset by larger benefits to the
political process in terms of constraining partisan gerrymandering.
We explore this possibility in Part IV when we examine the effect of
Baker on change in control of state legislatures.
III. ONE PERSON, ONE VOTE AND THE DREAM OF ACCURATE
REPRESENTATION
Most post-Baker defenders of the one-person, one-vote rule have
focused on malapportioned legislatures' misrepresentation of certain
identifiable groups of people. The principal "harm" of
malapportionment was that districts varying widely in population
helped produce legislatures that misrepresented the underlying
political composition of the state and underrepresented urban areas,
in particular.76
The first attempts to measure the partisan impact of post-Baker
reapportionments did not find a systematic national trend in one
76. As noted above, see supra note 14, we concentrate here on political representation
defined by partisanship rather than representation based on levels of urbanization, as
others have done and as Professor Schotland would have us do. We take this approach for
several reasons. First, it is much easier to identify and measure whether a certain party
has benefited or not as opposed to whether a certain type of area (rural, urban, suburban)
has. We can identify legislators as belonging to one or another party, but their districts
will often cover a mixture of levels of urbanization. (This problem is not insurmountable,
but would require some lengthy and fancy methodological explanations that space
prevents us from undertaking here.) Second, because we organize our legislative
institutions along party lines and legislation tends to get passed when at least one of the
parties is behind it, partisan representation is perhaps the most important measure of the
political effect of one person, one vote. Party affiliation also exists as the principal
political identity for most Americans and has always been the strongest predictor of vote
choice, thus making Baker's partisan effect a good indicator of the effect of the one-
person, one-vote rule on the translation of political preferences into legislative seats.
Finally, as we observe later in this Article, the urban-rural cleavage often mapped onto the
partisan cleavage in several states. Although neither party had a nationwide monopoly on
representation of rural, urban, and suburban interests, in particular states one party often
did.
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partisan direction or the other.77 Some found successful partisan
gerrymanders78 while others found unsuccessful ones79 or none at all.8°
Who "won" as a result of the one-person, one-vote decisions
appeared to depend on a number of factors: whether one party
controlled the redistricting process, the degree of malapportionment
in the preceding plan, the geographic dispersion or concentration of
partisans of each party, and the date of the new reapportionment (for
example, was the first post-Baker election in the midst of the 1964
Democratic landslide or the 1966 Republican retrenchment?). All
appeared to recognize, however, that a Republican bias in non-
southern congressional elections disappeared around the time of the
one-person, one-vote decisions.81 This bias produced about 6% more
Republican seats in the non-southern congressional delegation than
the Republicans' vote-share should have "earned" them. By the end
of the 1960s redistrictings, that figure had shrunk to under 1%. Was
the new wave of redistricting to blame? And if so, how and why?
In what will likely emerge as the definitive study of the impact of
the one-person, one-vote cases on elections to the U.S. House of
Representatives, Gary Cox and Jonathan Katz have developed a
model for 1960s redistricting that incorporates all institutional players
as well as the changing partisan environment throughout the decade. 8
What emerges from their study are context-specific arguments that
pay special attention to the "reversionary outcome" of a redistricting
dispute: the plan that goes into effect if the governor and legislature
cannot agree on a plan. The potential reversionary outcome, which
77. It is interesting to note that both parties (at the national level) hailed the one-
person, one-vote decisions. Democrats long thought that urban centers-a traditional
power base-were underrepresented and would benefit from redistricting under equal
population rules. (Actually, it turned out the suburbs were most underrepresented.) And
Republicans, looking at the various congressional district maps throughout the country,
noticed that their districts, on average, actually had more people in them than did the
Democrats' districts.
78. See, e.g., Ward Elliot, Prometheus, Proteus, Pandora, and Procrustes Unbound:
The Political Consequences of Reapportionment, 37 U. CI. L. REV. 474, 490 (1970);
Erikson, Congressional Elections, supra note 60.
79. See, e.g., Richard Born, Partisan Intentions and Election Day Realities in the
Congressional Redistricting Process, 79 AM. POL. Sc. REv. 305,305 (1985); Bullock, supra
note 61, at 575.
80. See, e.g., Jack L. Noragon, Redistricting, Political Outcomes, and Gerrymandering
in the 1960s, 219 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. Sci. 314,330-31 (1973).
81. See, e.g., David W. Brady & Bernard Grofman, Modeling the Swing Ratio and Bias
in the U.S.: 1846-1980, 10 POL. GEOGRAPHY 254 (1991); David W. Brady & Bernard
Grofman, Sectional Differences in Partisan Bias and Electoral Responsiveness in U.S.
House Elections, 1850-1980, 21 BRIT. J. POL. SC. 247, 247 (1991); Erikson, Partisan
Impact supra note 60; King & Gelman, supra note 52.
82. Cox & KATZ, supra note 45.
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would usually be determined by a court after Baker, can have both
direct and indirect effects on the districting plans passed in response
to the Court's edict. A direct effect arises when the legislature and
governor fail to agree on a district map, and then the bias of the
reversionary actor (a court) will be expressed in the plan that
emerges. An indirect effect arises when knowledge of the bias of the
reversionary actor alters the bargaining position of the parties
negotiating the redistricting plan, such that those who think the
reversion will benefit them "hold out" for and usually get a better
deal than their partners in negotiation would otherwise offer.
For Cox and Katz, the "reversionary outcome" after Baker
usually meant a plan drawn by a court consisting of
disproportionately Democratic appointees (given the "partisan"
composition of the judiciary in the mid-sixties). Thus, they argue that
the status quo before Baker favored Republicans (that is, prevented
plans that would counteract the extant Republican bias) whenever
Republicans could obstruct a Democratic or less biased redistricting
plan. Once the courts got involved, however, Republicans could not
rely on the existing redistricting plan as the default outcome of
government inaction.s Instead, under conditions of divided
government, Republicans had to negotiate a plan that their
Democratic counterparts found acceptable (a "bipartisan," usually
incumbent-favoring plan) or take their chances with the court that
would draw the plan once the parties reached stalemate.
Much as one of us84 might find the suggestion of systematic
judicial partisanship generally distasteful (despite a certain recent
Supreme Court debacle), Cox and Katz provide rigorous empirical
support for their model.8s The most interesting aspect of their
findings is that courts, regardless of partisanship, were equally likely
to strike down a malapportioned plan. 6 But partisanship crept in,
83. Id. (manuscript at 123) ("The more Democratic jurists a court had, the higher the
level of pro-Democratic bias in the redistricting plan it supervised.").
84. Persily, that is. One flaw in Cox and Katz's argument appears in their suggestion
that each type of court (state and federal and each level of the state and federal system)
would provide for a similar mode of reversion. For example, for five of their cases they
describe the U.S. Supreme Court as the supervising court because that court intervened
before the state could draw its lines to comply with Baker. But the U.S. Supreme Court
has never drawn district lines. It always remands to a district court to perform the dirty
work. So it seems that casting the Supreme Court as a Democratic reversion overlooks a
level of complexity that would also have been obvious to the state officials who were
bargaining and drawing the district lines. Cox & KATZ, supra note 45 (manuscript at 91).
85. See generally Cox & KATZ, supra note 45 (manuscript at 85-139).
86. Id. at 102 ("Holding constant a plan's malapportionment, a friendly court was not
significantly more likely in principle to accept it than a hostile court.").
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they say, when courts decided whether or not the rejected plan would
be used for the upcoming election (usually the 1964 Democratic
landslide or the 1966 Republican correction). 87 In other words, courts
largely agreed on the legal standard, but varied considerably in how
they would administer the conversion to an equitable
reapportionment. Some redrew districts themselves for the next
election, others threatened to do so if the legislature did not redraw
the map immediately, and still others (the "friendly" courts) allowed
the biased, malapportioned plan to stay in effect for the next election
while the linedrawers contemplated what changes to make for future
elections.
Cox and Katz arrive at the conclusion that Democratic court
supervision plus an overwhelming Democratic electoral tide in 1964
swept away much of the Republican bias of non-southern
congressional delegations and replaced it with a mild Democratic
bias. In particular, they note that Democratic courts supervised the
redrawing of the four largest Republican-controlled states-
Michigan, Ohio, New Jersey, and New York-and in about two-thirds
of the redistricting cases they study. The authors suggest that control
of the judiciary was equally as important as control of state
government. Thus, the existence of the Democratic reversion at a
time when state legislatures underwent significant partisan
recomposition following the 1964 Democratic landslide provided a
double blow to the Republican party outside the South. Because the
next two reapportionment cycles (1970 and 1980) were largely
incumbent-protecting or status-quo-reinforcing gerrymanders,",
moreover, the initial pro-Democratic blow had sustained effects.
Cox and Katz also use their model to explain the rise in the
incumbency advantage and the vanishing of marginal districts.
According to them, marginal districts decreased in large part because
Democratic gerrymanders in the 1960s packed Republicans into very
safe seats and bipartisan redistricting plans protected incumbents
generally. By Democratic design, a large number of districts
represented by Republican incumbents became noncompetitive.
Correlatively, many Democratic districts actually became less
Democratic (appearing, but not really being, more competitive) as
87. Id. at 129.
88. See Janet Campagna & Bernard Grofman, Party Control and Partisan Bias in
1980s Congressional Redistricting, 52 J. POL. 1242 (1990) (describing 1980s redistricting as
status quo reinforcing); Amihai Glazer et al., Partisan and Incumbency Effects of 1970s
Congressional Redistricting, 31 AM. J. POL. SCi. 680 (1987) (noting pro-incumbent effect
of 1970s congressional redistricting).
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the Democrats spread their supporters more efficiently to maximize
the number of seats they would win. Thus, they contend, we can
better understand why the marginals vanished, why the incumbency
advantage grew (almost regardless of the competitiveness of the
district) and why Democrats could maintain their hold on Congress
until 1994. Of course, gerrymandering is only one part of the story.
The other parts-a mid-sixties Democratic resurgence and other
institutional changes that insulated incumbents-helped codify the
changes brought about in the immediate post-Baker redistricting.
The modem consensus appears to be that in most contexts, the
one-person, one-vote rule had a "pro-representational" effect.89 By
that we mean that the introduction of equipopulous redistricting-
even when it aided a partisan gerrymander-appears to have
produced legislative delegations more representative and less biased
than those that existed before Baker. But a lot gets lost in the
generalities of this discussion: any representational effect appears to
vary based on context and over time. A more focused approach
would attempt to isolate the political impact of post-Baker
reapportionment from other co-dependent variables, including
concomitant population growth and ideological shifts taking place
during the politically turbulent sixties. The experiments we conduct
in the next Part highlight these context-specific effects.
IV. ONE PERSON, ONE VOTE AND STATE LEGISLATIVE
REPRESENTATION
Most studies of the political impact of one person, one vote
examine the effect on races for U.S. Congress. In this Part we
attempt to capture some of the effects of the Court's decisions on
elections to state legislatures. We begin by examining whether one
person, one vote affected competition for control of state legislatures.
Although many state legislative houses changed hands in the 1960s,
we are unable to say whether malapportionment and its removal are
to blame. Second, in order to assess the bias of malapportionment
and its potential removal through court-ordered redistricting, we
examine those states that redistricted only one of their legislative
chambers in response to Baker. The data reveal electoral effects
consistent with the prediction that densely populated areas gained
representation post-Baker. The party more closely aligned with the
more urban half of a state appears to have benefited the most from
89. See generally Gelman & King, supra note 52 (suggesting decennial redistricting
leads to higher responsiveness and lower bias).
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reapportionment, although neither party benefited nationally. In
addition, the magnitude of any Baker-induced change in the partisan
makeup of a state legislative body is a product of how
malapportioned the legislature was prior to redistricting. By
comparing the newly redistricted chamber with the one held constant,
we can better ascertain the independent effect of the move to
equipopulous districting. Finally, we look at the effect of one person,
one vote on bicameralism: specifically, whether the decisions had the
effect of making state upper and lower houses more similar. We find
greater similarity between chambers in the period after the institution
of the one-person, one-vote rule, suggesting that the rule may have
muted representational distortions that existed before Baker.
A. The Effect of One Person, One Vote on Competition for Control
of State Legislative Chambers
As mentioned in the description of the theoretical justifications
for one person, one vote, the competitiveness of an electoral system
can be measured both at the district level and at the level of control of
state legislatures. At least with regard to elections to the U.S. House
and probably to state legislatures as well, the consensus appears to be
that the move to equipopulous districting made incumbents
somewhat safer and contributed to the decrease in the number of
marginal (that is, competitive) districts.' As far as we know, no one
has examined the effect of one person, one vote on change in control
of state legislatures. As we note above, perhaps the most powerful
argument in defense of one person, one vote comes from those who
see court intervention as necessary to break political lock-ups and to
prevent insider self-dealing that immunizes factional or partisan blocs
from the cleansing effect of elections. One way to judge whether
Baker released electorates from such political strangleholds is to
examine whether Baker and its progeny led to greater changes in
control of state legislatures. We take a first crack at answering this
question and arrive at some instructive, even if preliminary and
mixed, results.
Our working hypothesis is that, before Baker, parties in control
90. Of course, as we note above, the story is much more complicated than we depict
here. Incumbents did not uniformly benefit from the move to decennial equipopulous
districting. Under conditions of divided government, all incumbents usually benefited.
And when one party controlled the redistricting process, usually its incumbents became
safer and several of its opponents' districts became super-safe as a result of packing. But
some incumbents of the "out party" became less safe when they were targeted for removal
by the party controlling the redistricting process.
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of a state legislature were more likely to stay in control because they
could malapportion their opponents' districts and keep them
perpetually in a minority position. Parties in power could use
malapportionment as a tool to maintain their dominance in the face
of adverse changes in demographics and voters' party loyalties.
Moreover, to the degree the malapportioned districts resulted from
calcified district lines owing to representation of counties or rural
interests,91 one might expect less turnover due to the repeated re-
election of the same party from the overrepresented districts.
If these arguments in defense of one person, one vote are
correct, we should expect to see two results. First, it should be the
case that legislatures changed hands more frequently in the years
following Baker-ordered reapportionments than in the years prior.
Second, this effect should have been more pronounced in the
legislative chambers that were the most malapportioned prior to
Baker-ordered redistricting. To what degree were these expectations
met?
A glance at Figure 2 shows that the number of legislative
chambers changing control rose in the immediate wake of Baker-
ordered reapportionments. In the 1966 election cycle-in which a
plurality of states held their first post-Baker legislative elections-
fully thirty of the nation's ninety-nine state legislative chambers
changed hands, a degree unmatched in the post-World War II era.
Further analysis bears out this finding. We analyzed elections in
sixty-eight legislative chambers92  to examine whether state
legislatures were more likely to change hands in the decade before or
the decade after the first post-Baker reapportionment. As shown in
the last row of Table 2, the mean number of turnovers per ten years
per legislative chamber increased from 0.88 in the ten years prior to
each chamber's first post-Baker reapportionment to 1.21 in the ten
years afterward. The number of chambers that changed hands at
least once also rose, from thirty-four to thirty-nine. Of course, these
findings do not prove conclusively that Baker-ordered
reapportionment led to increased legislative turnovers. As
mentioned above, the political turmoil of the late 1960s and early
91. See, e.g., WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 377 U.S. 633,636 (1964).
92. Our analysis does not include southern states, which remained under Democratic
control during the entire time period analyzed. It also does not include Alaska and
Hawaii (which did not have legislative elections for the entire ten-year period prior to
their Baker-ordered reapportionments), nor Minnesota (which held non-partisan
legislative elections until 1974). Also excluded is the Arizona House, for which
malapportionment data are not available. Note that the year of the first post-Baker
reapportionment differs from state to state, and in some cases from house to senate within
states.
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the late 1960s and early 1970s might also have contributed to the rise
in turnovers. But just as we can say that one person, one vote did not
stand in the way of incumbent re-election, we can also say that it did
not prevent (and perhaps contributed to) a rise in the number of state
legislative chambers changing hands.
FIGURE 2: Changes in Party Control of State Legislatures
1940-2000
Year
However, contrary to advocates' expectations, whatever effects
reapportionment appears to have on competition for legislative
control does not vary by the degree to which state legislatures were
malapportioned prior to Baker-ordered redistricting. We divided the
sixty-eight chambers in our analysis into two equal groups: those with
high and low degrees of malapportionment. As shown in Table 2,
turnovers increased in both groups of states to approximately the
same extent. (Interestingly, the states that were more equitably
apportioned before Baker exhibit higher numbers of turnovers
overall.) One might have expected that those chambers that moved
from severe malapportionment to equitable apportionment might
have been more likely to turn over. After all, if malapportionment
was keeping the "ins" in, then equitable apportionment should have
-...-..Ho
.- Ut-- Sena
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led to a greater likelihood that the "ins" would get kicked out. We do
not find that hypothesis borne out in the data.
This exploratory analysis indicates that one of the initial hopes of
one-person, one-vote advocates was met: state legislative electoral
competitiveness increased in the wake of Baker-ordered redistricting.
However, contrary to advocates' expectations, such redistricting did
not have a greater effect in states that were the most malapportioned
prior to Baker. Instead, legislative chambers with more equipopulous
districts prior to Baker were more likely to change party hands, both
before and after the first redistricting pursuant to one person, one
vote.
TABLE 2: The Effect of Baker on Control of State Legislatures*
Average Number of Turnovers in Party Number of Chambers that Changed
Control Hands at Least Once
Degree of In Ten Years In Ten Years In Ten Years In Ten Years
Malapportionment Prior to First After First Prior to First After First
(% Needed to
Control Chamber, Post-Baker Post-Baker Post-Baker Post-Baker
1962) Reapportionment Reapportionment Reapportionment Reapportionment
High (24.9%) 0.79 1.12 15 18
Low (40.7%) 0.97 1.29 19 21
Mean orTotal 0.88 1.21 34 39
Source: NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES.
*Total Number of legislative chambers included in analysis: 68.
B. A Natural Experiment with One Person, One Vote
From the review of the literature above, it should be clear that
very little is gained by looking at the state of the world before Baker
v. Carr, comparing it to the world afterward, and then blaming
redistricting for the change. So much was happening in the sixties
that isolating the independent effect of redistricting on any political
phenomenon presents a daunting task. Some have attempted to
"control" for the other aspects of the sixties upheaval by comparing
states that redistricted in a certain year with those that did not, to
point out, for example, that marginals vanished in both contexts.
That method represents an improvement but might not capture state-
specific changes as a result of the redistricting process. It is possible,
for example, that the class of states that underwent redistricting
differed in systematic ways from those that did not and that
redistricting may have caused changes in some states that were
occurring "naturally" in others.
The incremental approach of the Supreme Court's redistricting
cases allows for a different method to tackle some of the same
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problems. Baker v. Carr, let us not forget, only indicated that
malapportionment presented a justiciable question under the Equal
Protection Clause.93 The precise standard of equal population, and
more importantly for our purposes the scope of the decision to all
legislative elections, was not recognized until later cases, such as
Wesberry94 and Reynolds.95 One plausible reading of Baker that many
found appealing was that the decision required equipopulous
districting for only one house of the state legislature. After all, what
would be the purpose of bicameralism if equal protection required
both houses to have the same basis of representation? Moreover,
many states based their system of representation on the federal
model-one body that represented regions or counties and another
based more or less on population-or at least assumed that Baker did
not cast doubt on the propriety of the analogy to the U.S. Senate.
The lag in the Court's clarification that the one-person, one-vote rule
applied to both houses allowed a natural experiment to take place
from which we might be able to get a sense of the independent
partisan effects of the shift to new districts.
Seven non-southern states held elections in which one house's
lines were redrawn, but the other body's districts remained constant.
By comparing the partisan shifts that took place in each house, we
can separate the effects of redistricting from contemporaneous
political trends. Three factors can drive the change in one party's seat
share (arbitrarily, we look at the Democratic share) from one election
to the next:
(1) the change in the Democrats' share of the popular vote;
(2) the move from malapportionment to more equitable ap-
portionment; and
(3) a new partisan bias brought by a political gerrymander.
In the house with constant districts, only (1) can account for shifts in
the Democratic seat share. This allows us to estimate the magnitude
of electoral trends, and to isolate the effect that (2) and (3) have on
seat shares in the redistricted house.
The "net" effect of redistricting should follow a predictable
pattern. In states where densely populated areas were poorly
93. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,237 (1962) ("The right asserted is within the reach
of judicial protection under the Fourteenth Amendment.").
94. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1964) (invalidating malapportioned
congressional districts).
95. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964) (applying the one-person, one-vote
rule to both houses of a state legislature).
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represented pre-Baker, the urban-rural party alignment should
determine the direction of the change brought by (2). The party that
performs better in cities and suburbs than in rural areas should be the
one that benefits when "rotten boroughs" are eliminated. To
measure this alignment, we use Erikson's score that subtracts
Democratic strength in the rural half of a state from the Democratic
vote share in the more urban half, in the 1964 or 1966 gubernatorial
race.96 The level of previous malapportionment can help determine
the magnitude of the change brought by (2): seat shares will change
most where urban and suburban voters were most severely
underrepresented. Our measure of malapportionment, which
appeared earlier in Table 1, comes from the National Municipal
League, which reports the minimum percentage of voters needed to
elect a majority to a legislative house.97 Finally, the affiliations of the
political actors controlling post-Baker reapportionment will be
responsible for any partisan bias resulting from a political
gerrymander (3).
We summarize the data in Table 3. Overall, the changes in
legislative seat shares fit with our expectations, showing that the one-
person, one-vote decisions often (but not always) brought predictable
political effects.
The data reveal two interesting findings: first, neither party had
a national monopoly on the urban vote; and second, the party aligned
with urbanites usually benefited from the move to equipopulous
districting. Contrary to some expectations, Democrats were not
uniformly the party of urban America. In Arizona, Hawaii, and
Alaska, Republicans were disproportionately urban.98  The
96. See Erikson, Partisan Impact, supra note 60. Erikson's method has the
unfortunate consequence of sweeping suburbs and cities together. When we refer to
"urban" voters here, we mean voters in the more urban half of the state, which often
includes suburbs. We hope to refine the analysis in a later paper to better answer the
suburb question Professor Schotland poses in his paper. Erikson also does not provide
data for Alaska, Hawaii, and New Jersey. Our own independent research concluded that
Republicans were the urban party in Alaska and Hawaii, while the Democrats were the
urban party in New Jersey. See NATIONAL MUNICIPAL LEAGUE, APPORTIONMENT IN
THE NINETEEN SIXTIES (1967); David E. Clarke & William M. Dickson, Alaska, in
IMPACT OF REAPPORTIONMENT, supra note 60, at 31-48; Richard L. Ender, Alaska, in
REAPPORTIONMENT POLITICS: THE HISTORY OF REDISTRICTING IN THE FIFTY STATES
31-35 (Leroy Hardy et al. eds., 1981) [hereinafter REAPPORTIONMENT POLITICS];
Richard H. Kosaki, Hawaii, in REAPPORTIONMENT POLITICS, supra, at 86-95; Norman
Miller & Harold S. Roberts, Hawaii, in IMPACT OF REAPPORTIONMENT, supra note 60, at
113-36.
97. NATIONAL MUNICIPAL LEAGUE, supra note 96.
98. Anchorage, Phoenix, and Honolulu were all poorly represented before those
states moved toward equitable apportionment and contained the states' highest
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Democrats controlling the redistricting process in Hawaii and Alaska
could do nothing to stop the immediate increase in Republican
representation that one person, one vote caused. A court redrew the
Arizona Senate, one of the most malapportioned state houses in the
country, to the inevitable benefit of Maricopa County (Phoenix) and
its heavily Republican electorate in the 1966 election. In the words of
two observers at the time, "[I]t seems that reapportionment has
served as a catalyst releasing Republican energies latent in the
Arizona political situation .... The results.., have been traumatic
for Democrats and exhilarating for Republicans." 99
TABLE 3: Net Partisan Advantages from Reapportionment
Apportionment Which
State, House, and Score Pre.Baker Who Party Was Democrats' Seat Change in Change in et PartyYearofFirst (High Score Controlled Stronger Share, Democrats' Seat Democra Advantage
neIn Reapportioned Share, Seat Share, AdatgElection After Denotes Redistricting the Urban Repore oned from
Reapportionment Equitable Process? Half of the House, Before Reapportioned Control R
Apportionment) State? Reapportionment House House 
eapportonment
Alaska 20.0%
Senate, 1966 35.0 Democratic Republican 85.0% -55.0% -35.0% Republican
Senate. 12.8 Court Republican 92.9% -46.2% -9.6% 36lican
Hawaii 23.4 Democratic Republican 64.0% 4.0% 0% 4.0%
Senate, 1966 Republican
Massachusetts 45.3 Democratic Slight 62.5% 7.9% 2.5% 5.4%
House, 1964 Republican Democratic
Maine 46.9 Court Democratic 29.4% 14.4% 6.5%
Senate, 1968 Democratic
New Jersey Republican 19.6%
ne, 1965 19.0 under rourt Democratic 28.6% 30.0% 18.3%
Senate 1965 supervision Demcratic
Won,1g 26.9 Court Democratic 48.0% -8.0% -6.7% R.3 c
Senate. 1966 Republican
In Massachusetts, Maine, and New Jersey, the Democrats
benefited from the first equipopulous apportionment. In
Massachusetts and Maine, Democratic gains were slight-given the
states' history of equitable apportionment, the changes wrought by
Baker and Reynolds were not too traumatic. For New Jersey, the
change was significant. New Jersey's Senate was based on county
concentrations of Republicans. See REAPPORTIONMENT POLITICS, supra note 96, at 31-
35,36-43,86-94.
99. Bruce B. Mason & Leonard E. Goodall, Arizona, in IMPACT OF
REAPPORTIONMENT, supra note 60, at 65-66. Republican gains in Arizona as a result of
redistricting were somewhat ironic. Arizona Republicans-Goldwater-esque opponents
of Warren Court activism even in the redistricting realm-did not run to court in the wake
of Baker. A University of Arizona law student, not a representative of the Republican
party, brought the case that allowed a federal court to redraw Arizona's malapportioned
Senate.
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lines and was one of the most malapportioned in the country.1°0
Under "judicial pressure," the Republican legislature and governor
redrew the lines to the great benefit of Democrats who were strong in
urban areas.
Wyoming is somewhat of an outlier for our analysis. Democrats
were stronger in Wyoming's few urban areas, according to Erikson's
criteria, although others suggest that the partisan cleavage in
Wyoming does not track the urban-rural cleavage. 1 1 At the time of
the 1965 reapportionment, Wyoming had a divided government, with
a Republican senate and governor and a Democratic house. Because
the parties could not agree on a reapportionment plan, a federal court
drew the lines. The slight Republican gain was probably the result of
a court-ordered plan bent on upsetting the partisan balance as little as
possible. As one analyst described the plan,
the court was something less than happy with the role
into which it had been cast by the decision in the
Baker case.... The compromise by the court of using
bits and pieces of each of the major plans before the
legislature and its trading of major party seats in
different areas of the state seem to indicate that it was
hoping to please as many people as possible."°
The plan for Wyoming appears to have been a status quo reinforcing
plan, and neither party benefited greatly from the move to equitable
reapportionment.
The natural experiment provided by these seven states highlights
the important factors in determining the beneficiaries of one person,
one vote. The more urban party in a given state appeared to benefit,
although neither party can be said to have benefited nationally from
equipopulous districting. A party in control of the redistricting
process might be able to minimize the damage by staving off gains
from the "out" party through gerrymanders within the confines of
one person, one vote. Finally, the magnitude of any change as a
result of Baker is largely a product of how malapportioned the
legislature was beforehand. When district lines only needed to be
100. See Ernest Reock, New Jersey, in REAPPORTIONMENT POLITICS, supra note 96, at
216-19.
101. See Oliver Walter, Wyoming, in REAPPORTIONMENT POLITICS, supra note 96, at
355 ("The number of farmers and ranchers in the legislature declined markedly [after
reapportionment], but those lawmakers who replaced them did not demonstrate markedly
different political philosophies. Wyoming is a rural and homogenous state.... [P]artisan
divisions do not necessarily parallel rural-urban divisions.").
102. John B. Richard, Wyoming, in IMPACT OF REAPPORTIONMENT, supra note 60, at
321-22.
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moved slightly to bring them to population equality, neither party
would experience a windfall from the less radical change Baker
produced in that context.
C. The Removal of Representational Distortion and the Convergence
of State Legislative Chambers
For states in which one house was severely malapportioned
compared to the other prior to Baker v. Carr, we hypothesize that to
the extent malapportionment was causing a distortion in the
translation of vote shares to seat shares, that distortion should be
more pronounced in the more malapportioned chamber.10 3
Therefore, in elections after the first post-Baker apportionments, we
would expect the partisan makeup of state legislative chambers to
become more similar. Indeed, we find convergence between
chambers following the creation of the one-person, one-vote rule.
Take, for example, Vermont. In 1962, Vermont's House and
Senate exhibited a greater difference in the degree of
malapportionment-that is, the minimum proportion of the state's
voters that could gain control of a legislative chamber-than the
chambers of any other state legislature in the nation. While seats
representing 47% of the state's voters were necessary to control the
Vermont Senate, seats representing only 12% of voters were enough
to control the Vermont House 3 4  To the extent that
malapportionment leads to representational distortion, we would
expect to see such distortion in the Vermont House, but not in the
Senate.
As required by Baker and Reynolds, Vermont reapportioned its
legislature in 1965. In the last legislative session to meet prior to this
reapportionment, Democrats controlled 40% of senate seats, and
only 26% of house seats-a difference of fourteen percentage points
between the two chambers. If malapportionment caused
representational distortion, we would expect to see a shrinking of the
difference in the partisan makeup between Vermont's two legislative
chambers. In the elections of 1966, Democrats captured only 27% of
the senate seats-a loss of thirteen percentage points. But they won
103. We use the term "distortion" here instead of "bias" because our data do not allow
us to distinguish between "bias" and "responsiveness" per the definition provided by
Gelman and King, supra note 52. We therefore use "distortion" to refer to the extent to
which vote shares do not equal seat shares in a legislative chamber.
104. Frank M. Bryan, Vennont, in REAPPORTIONMENT POLITICS, supra note 96, at 328
("By 1960... only 11.8 percent of Vermont's population held 51 percent of the seats and
could potentially control legislation.").
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37% of the house seats-a gain of eleven percentage points. The
difference in proportion of seats held by Democrats in the two
chambers decreased to roughly ten percentage points. In other
words, in the wake of the reapportionment required by Baker v. Carr,
the two chambers had become slightly more similar in their partisan
makeup.
Was this true in other states in which one chamber was severely
malapportioned compared to the other prior to Baker v. Carr? Table
4 shows the relevant statistics for Vermont plus the nine other states
with the greatest difference in malapportionment between their two
legislative chambers. 0 5 A glance at the right-hand column in Table 4
shows that of our "top ten" states, eight states' legislative chambers
became more similar in their partisan makeup in the elections
immediately following their first post-Baker reapportionment. In the
ten states, there was a twelve percentage-point difference on average
TABLE 4: Baker's Effect on the Difference in Partisan Makeup of
States with Greatest Difference in Malapportionment Between
Legislative Chambers
Pre-Baker Post-BakerDifference Election anen
Minimum in Year of Changetin(A) (B) Difference
State Percentage of Malappor- First Post- Absdite Absolute Between
Voters Needed to tionment Baker PerenteoSeatsHeld Valeof Percent otSeats Held Valeof
Control In 1962 Between I pportlon- by eIinorats Difereace bylDeioects Differe(ce Chambers
Chambers ment Be (el. B -e. A)
Chambers Chambers
SENATE HOUSE SENATE HOUSE SENATE HOUSE
Vuanat 47.0 11.6 35.4 1966 40.0% 26.0% 14.0% 26.7% 3&7% 10.0% 40%
California 10.7 44.7 34.0 1966 62.5% 61.3% 1.3% 50.0% 52.5% 2.5% 1.3%
Rh 81 & _465 _2&4 1966 6W.2% 76.0% 10.f% 70.0% 66.% 4A% -68
New, Jersey 19.0 46.5 27.5 1966 28.6% 46.7% 18.1% 58.6% 65.0% 6.4% -11.7%
Mmio 47.7 263 27.4 1966 67.6% 7&1% &.4% 67.6% 65.6% 2.0* .0&4%
Nevada 8.0 35.0 27,0 1966 47.1% 67.6% 20.5% 55.0% 52.5% 2.5% -18.0%
Cowtct33-4 12A0 21A 196 63.9% 37.8% 26.1% K9A% 66.1% 3J3% -22.8*
Montana 16.1 36.6 20.5 1966 57.1% 59.6% 2.4% 54.5% 38.5% 16.1% 13.7%
Wo 16. 32.7 16.1 1966 412% 46.8% 3.7% 37.1% 45.7% 8.6% 4.9%
Michigan 29.0 44.0 15.0 1964 32.4% 47.3% 14.9% 60.5% 66.4% 5.8% -9.1%
Averages 24.6 33.0 25.3 50.8% 54.5% 12.0% 55.0% 55.5% 6.1% -5.9%
105. Hawaii and South Carolina were among the ten states with the greatest difference
in malapportionment between house and senate, but are not included here. This is
because both states reapportioned their house and senate in different years, making our
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in partisan makeup of the house and senate prior to Baker. After the
first legislative elections post-Baker, the gap between chambers
narrowed on average to about six percentage points.
It is possible that this change was part of a broader historical
trend, and not due particularly to the effects of Baker. To explore
this hypothesis, we plotted the average of the absolute value of the
difference between the house and senate of these ten states in the
period 1938 to 1998. As shown in Figure 3, the partisan makeup of
the legislative chambers in these ten states became, on average,
substantially more similar in the wake of Baker v. Carr. Between
1962 and 1966-the years in which all ten states held their first
elections with post-Baker lines-the average difference in partisan
makeup between chambers dropped from 13.7% to 5.7%. In no
other period in recent U.S. history did the partisan makeup of the
legislative chambers in these ten states converge so quickly. To
further test whether this effect can truly be ascribed to Baker, we also
plot the average difference in chamber partisan makeup for all state
legislatures from 1938 to 1998. The result supports the convergence
hypothesis: while the partisan makeup of the upper and lower houses
of all state legislatures became more similar in the period
immediately following Baker, the change is by no means as dramatic
as that for the "top ten" states.
FIGURE 3: The Convergence of State Legislative Chambers After
Baker v. Carr
18% States with Greatest Difference
15 in Malapportionment Pre-BakerS15%
~Cj12% . .
6%
0%
1938 1946 1954 1962 1970 1978 1986 1994
Source: National Conference of State Legislatures, Election Data.
experiment inapplicable in their cases.
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It would appear, then, that Baker v. Carr did lead state legislative
chambers to become more similar to each other-at least in partisan
makeup. Where the severe malapportionment of one chamber may
have previously given one party a greater advantage in one house
than the other, such advantages were sharply reduced in the years
following Baker.10 6
V. WHAT IF THE PRE-BAKER DISTRICTS HAD STAYED IN PLACE?
The districting scheme the Court struck down in Baker itself had
been in place for over sixty years. Malapportioned legislatures often
evolved not from deliberate attempts to overrepresent some at the
expense of others, but from inertia in the face of population shifts.
County lines that once offered equitable representation became more
inequitable over time as the population moved from rural to urban to
suburban areas. By ordering redistricting that would keep up with
demographic changes reflected in each census, the Court ensured that
the lifespan of a redistricting plan would never last beyond ten years.
Frequent "updating" of the district lines, one would assume, would
produce more accurate representation of the population. We decided
to test that assumption.
For a glimpse into how the partisan makeup of legislatures might
look had there been no Baker v. Carr, we conducted a counterfactual
experiment to ask: what would happen if the district lines struck
down by the one-person, one-vote cases still stood today? To explore
this question, we identified three states from the original Reynolds v.
Sims docket with voter registration data readily available by county
(Delaware, Maryland, and New York). To this we added California,
for which we obtained registration data from the California Statewide
Database at the University of California, Berkeley. California is also
appropriate for examination, as Chief Justice Warren noted in his
memoirs, because its state senate was considered one of the most
106. Two interesting findings that we do not discuss here relate to the post-Baker
growth in the number of divided legislatures (where one party controls the upper house
and another controls the lower house) and competitive or marginal chambers. Although
we find that state legislative chambers are more alike in their partisan makeup since 1960,
they are also more likely to be controlled by different parties. In the last twenty years the
number of divided legislatures has jumped from about seven to thirteen. The rise in parity
between the parties within state legislative chambers is also striking. In 1964, only eleven
chambers had majority parties that controlled less than 55% of the seats, but by 2000, that
number had grown to twenty-seven. Much of this might be attributed to the rise of the
Republican Party in the South, but most of the current split state legislatures are in the
Midwest and a large number of non-southern states have chambers with majorities barely
clinging to control.
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malapportioned in 1962. Its largest senate district (Los Angeles
County) included more than six million people, while its smallest had
only 14,000 people. The votes in districts totaling just 11% of the
state's population were enough to control the senate.
In each state, we then "drew" the state senate lines in place when
the Baker ruling came down over the current voter registration data.
(We chose to use state senate lines because they were coterminous
with county boundaries.) Finally, we estimated which party would
win each seat through a crude approximation: the party with the
registration edge in the district was presumed to win that district's
seat. Where counties were divided into districts, we allocated the
county's senate seats to parties according to their proportion of the
registered voters in that county. Only voters registered with the
Democratic or Republican Party are included in our calculations.
We conducted nothing more than a "back of the envelope" test,
but the results, shown in Table 4, are illuminating. Of the four states
we studied, only in Maryland can we say that the current system is
superior to the pre-Baker districts in accurately translating votes into
seats. Below, we discuss each of these states in turn.
TABLE 5: A Comparison of the 2000 and 1960 District Maps
with 2000 Partisanship Data
% of Two-Party State Senate Makeup Expected State Senate
State Registered 2000 Makeup, 2000 Data with
Voters, 2000 Pre-Baker Districts
% of Seats Held % of Seats HeldD by Dems by Dems
California 56.6% 43.4% 26 14 65.0% 21 19 52.5%
Delaware 55.9% 44.1% 13 8 54.2% 13 8 54.2%
Maryland 57.0% 29.6% 34 13 72.3% 23 6 79.3%
New York 62.2% 37.8% 25 36 41.0% 29 28 50.9%
Delaware. In a last-ditch attempt to equate its senate
apportionment scheme with that of the U.S. Senate, Delaware's
legislature adopted a constitutional amendment in 1963 that
equalized senate seats among the state's three counties. Before the
amendment, the state's largest county-New Castle-was allotted
seven seats, and its other two counties-Kent and Sussex-five each.
Counties were divided into the requisite number of districts, each of
which elected one senator. In addition, two of New Castle County's
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seven districts were required to be drawn outside of Wilmington, the
state's largest city. The amendment gave Kent and Sussex two
additional senators each, bringing the total number of senators for
each county to seven. In a further complication, the new senators in
Kent and Sussex would be chosen at large, rather than from
geographically distinct districts. The result was that urban
Wilmington residents had far fewer senators than would be allotted to
them under an equipopulous scheme.107
How would this system affect the partisan makeup of Delaware's
Senate today? Not one bit, according to our estimates. Democrats
currently hold a thirteen to eight advantage in the Delaware Senate.108
Our calculations found that the same would hold true under the
crazy-quilt apportionment adopted by Delaware in 1963. We
presumed that Wilmington's five seats would be held by Democrats,
the other two New Castle seats by Republicans. We then allocated
Kent and Sussex's senate seats to the parties according to their
proportion of the registered voters in each county.10 9 The result: an
identical thirteen to eight advantage for Democrats. 10
Maryland. The state of Maryland's pre-Baker Senate districting
system allotted one senator to each of the state's twenty-three
counties, and a total of six senators to the city of Baltimore,"' which
in 1960 accounted for about 16% of the state's population. To
estimate the effect of these lines on the makeup of today's Maryland
Senate, we allotted each county's senator to the party holding the
voter registration advantage in that county." We then allotted each
107. Brief of Amicus Curiae United States at 28-29, Roman v. Sincock, 377 U.S. 695
(1964) (No. 63-307).
108. National Conference of State Legislatures, 2001 Partisan Composition of State
Legislature, at http://www.ncsl.orglncsldb/elect98/partcomp.cfin?yearsel=2001 (last visited
Feb. 8,2002) (on file with North Carolina Law Review).
109. Voter Registration Data from Delaware Commissioner of Elections, at
http://www.state.de.us/electionlreportse70r2601sd.htm (last updated May 1, 2002) (on file
with the North Carolina Law Review).
110. If one pays attention to the number of seats controlled by Democrats (that is,
districts in which they were a majority) under the 1960 and 2000 lines, the 1960 lines
translate votes into seats more accurately than the 2000 lines. Under the 2000 lines,
seventeen out of twenty-one districts (80.9%) have a Democratic plurality. Under the
1960 lines, only thirteen of twenty-one (61.9%) would be controlled by Democrats. Given
that the current state percentage of Democrats is only 56.0%, the 1960 lines produce much
less representational distortion.
111. Brief of Amicus Curiae Attorney General of the United States at 8-9, Md. Comm.
for Fair Representation v. Tawes, 377 U.S. 656 (1964) (No. 63-29).
112. Maryland State Board of Elections, Voter Registration Activity Yearly Report
2000, at http:lwww.elections.state.md.us/pdflvrar/2000.pdf (last visited Apr. 3, 2002) (on
file with the North Carolina Law Review).
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of the six senators in heavily Democratic Baltimore to the Democrats.
The result: a twenty-three to six advantage for Democrats (or 79% of
seats) were 1960's lines in effect today. Democrats currently hold a
thirty-four to thirteen edge (72% of seats) in the Maryland Senate, so
they would actually enjoy a greater advantage if the pre-Baker lines
still stood. The level of distortion of the system is therefore slightly
less under today's apportionment than it would be under the 1960
lines. 3
New York. New York's pre-Baker Senate apportionment rules
are the most complicated of any state discussed here. Senators were
allotted to counties roughly on the basis of population, and counties
with more than one senator were divided into districts. But through
an additional series of apportionment rules, the New York
Constitution ensured that any county with more than 6% of the
state's population would be underrepresented in the state senate.114
Six counties-Bronx, Erie, Kings, Nassau, New York (that is,
Manhattan) and Queens-fell into this category in 1960. The U.S.
Department of Justice calculated that, in the round of redistricting to
take place after the 1960 census, these six counties would receive
twenty-six of fifty-seven senate seats (or 46%)-even though they
together made up roughly 60% of the state's population.115
How would 1960's lines affect today's partisan makeup of the
New York Senate? First, it should be noted that despite the
Democrats' 62 to 38% voter registration advantage in New York,116
113. However, if one looks instead at the number of districts in which Democrats
constitute a plurality, the 1960 lines more accurately translate votes into seats. If the 1960
lines were in place Democrats would control 79.3% of the seats; under the 2000 lines
Democrats constituted a plurality in 87.2% of the seats. The 1960 lines would better
reflect the state's 57% Democratic majority. See Maryland State Board of Elections,
Voter Registration . Figures by County as of October 13, 2000, at
http:l/www.elections.state.md.us/pdflvrar/OOOL0O13.pdf (last visited Mar. 13, 2002) (on
file with the North Carolina Law Review).
114. For a full discussion of the apportionment system, see Brief of Amicus Curiae
Department of Justice at 14-20, WMCA v. Simon, 370 U.S. 190 (1962) (No. 61-836).
115. Id. at 17. New York's complex apportionment system-and the fact that the
state's redistricting in response to the 1960 census had not yet taken place when the Baker
v. Carr decision was announced-further complicated our counterfactual analysis. Not
only did we need to impute today's registration data onto the lines in place before Baker,
we also had to hypothesize how the state might have drawn the lines in the wake of the
1960 census figures. We take our apportionment estimates from the amicus brief filed by
the U.S. Department of Justice in New York's one-person, one-vote case (WMCA v.
Simon), which were in turn derived from county population totals and the appropriate
provisions of the New York State Constitution. Id. at 19, 39-46.
116. New York State Board of Elections, Voter Enrollment History by County, at
http://wwv.elections.state.ny.us/enrollment/enroll.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2002) (on file
with the North Carolina Law Review).
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the Republican party has historically maintained an iron grip on the
state senate and currently controls the chamber with thirty-six seats to
the Democrats' twenty-five. Our best estimates found that the pre-
Baker districting scheme would bring about sweeping change:
Democrats would narrowly control the senate by a twenty-nine to
twenty-eight margin, owing to the registration advantage they hold in
the state's urban counties7
California."8  Prior to the reapportionment revolution,
California's senate districts were limited to one per county-leading
to the gross malapportionment described above. The apportionment
rules ensured that rural and agricultural counties would be over-
represented in the senate compared to densely urban counties like
Los Angeles and San Francisco. One would imagine that if these
senate district lines were still in place today, they would confer an
advantage to Republicans-and indeed this is the case. The shift,
however, would not be large enough to switch control of the senate.
Where Democrats currently hold a twenty-six to fourteen advantage
in the California Senate, it would be narrowed to twenty-one to
nineteen were senators still chosen from the districts in place in 1962.
The question remains as to which districting setup would more
accurately translate votes into seats. Democrats currently make up
57% of California voters registered with one of the two major parties.
They currently control 65% of the senate seats-a pro-Democratic
distortion of about eight percentage points. With 1962's lines in
place, Democrats would control 53% of the senate seats, for a pro-
Republican distortion of about four percentage points. Therefore the
distortion in California's senate districting system would actually be
less under the pre-Baker v. Carr lines than it is today.
This snapshot view of Chief Justice Warren's home state suggests
that the representational distortion created by county-based districts
prior to Baker v. Carr was smaller than current levels. Figure 4 tracks
the Democratic share of seats in both houses of California's
legislature, along with party identification, beginning with the
117. New York is the only state of the four examined here where the percent of seats
with Democratic pluralities under the 2000 lines is closer to the Democratic proportion of
the state's electorate. Democrats constituted a plurality in thirty-three of sixty-one
districts (54.1%) in 2000, but would constitute a plurality in twenty-nine of fifty-seven
districts (50.9%) under the 1960 lines. The 2000 lines more accurately capture the partisan
breakdown of the state.
118. Data on California are available upon request from the Statewide Database at the
University of California, Berkeley, at http://swdb.berkeley.edu.
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members elected in 1960. A vertical line marks the timing of the 1965
reapportionment of both houses.
FIGURE 4: Party Identification and Party Control of the California
Legislature, 1960-1994
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Source: David Brady & Brian Gaines, A House Discarded? Evaluating the Case for a Unicameral
California Legislature, in CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM IN CALIFORNIA: MAKING STATE GOVERNMENT
MORE EFFECTIvE AND RESPONSIVE (Bruce Cain & Roger Noll eds., 1995) (providing seat shares).
When the Democrat-controlled legislature redrew its lines in a
September 1965 special session," 9 was there an immediate partisan
impact? Because the old senate districts had favored rural voters so
much, and given the authors of the new plan, one might expect that
Democrats would gain seats, especially in the upper chamber. The
opposite occurred. The immediate impact in the senate was that the
Democratic edge decreased from twenty-seven to thirteen after the
1964 elections to twenty-one to nineteen after the 1966 elections.
Democratic losses were slightly smaller in the assembly, where
districts had previously been based on population. In that chamber,
the Democratic advantage dropped from forty-nine to thirty-one in
1964 to forty-two to thirty-eight in 1966.
Much of these Republican gains in the immediate wake of
California's first post-Baker reapportionment can be attributed to
119. COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, THE BOOK OF THE STATES 64 (1966).
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shifts in the electorate. Republicans won back seats in both houses,
not just the formerly malapportioned senate. Their gains continued
in the 1968 elections, when they took a one-seat majority in each
chamber. Voters' identification with the Democratic Party dropped
from 58% in 1966 to 54% in 1968, and then to 51% by 1974.120 The
rightward turn of California's electorate during the era of Reagan's
governorship (1966-1974) seems a sufficient explanation of
Republican gains in the legislature.
Still, why was there no Democratic surge in the senate when
reapportionment gave full representation to urban voters and
suburbanites? The absence of such a partisan effect can be accounted
for by the fact that the parties did not have very different
demographic bases in California at the time of Baker v. Carr.
According to a September 1960 Field Poll, 15% of Republicans came
from rural areas, 55% from cities with populations of 2,500-499,999,
and 30% from cities of 500,000 and over. Almost mirroring these
proportions, 17% of Democrats came from rural areas, 48% from
cities with populations of 2,500-499,999, and 35% from cities of
500,000 and over.121 Many voters in the agricultural Central Valley
region had migrated from Oklahoma during the Great Depression,
and, though conservative, retained the Democratic loyalties of their
southern upbringing. In light of this evidence, it is unsurprising that
the move away from a rural-dominated senate had no clear partisan
effect.
Representational distortion in California's electoral system can
be roughly measured by the difference between party registration in
the electorate and party seat share in the legislature. This gap can be
observed in Figure 4. In the immediate aftermath of the 1965
reapportionment, the gap shrank. Especially for the senate, reducing
malapportionment had its intended effect of lessening bias and thus
improving representation. Gradually, though, the gap between
partisanship and party control began to grow again. Perhaps
Democrats' control of redistricting in 1980 gave them the means to
increase their electoral edge. Although Baker v. Carr initially
reduced bias in California by correcting the senate's
malapportionment, the gap in representation returned to even higher
levels when district lines were frequently redrawn by political
120. The Field Institute, A Digest on California's Political Demography, 5
CALIFORNIA OPINION INDEX (Nov. 1992).
121. Mervin D. Field, California Democratic and Republican Party Members
Compared, Release No. 305, THE CALIFORNIA POLL, Sept. 28,1960.
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Summary. Substituting pre-Baker lines for today's state senate
districts does not produce any wholesale distortion in the translation
of votes into seats, nor does it appear to benefit one party or another
across states. This finding is all the more remarkable when one
considers that our sample of four states is, if anything, biased in the
direction of states in which we would expect to see the greatest
improvement due to court-ordered redistricting following Baker.
Perhaps most surprising is that in some states, the pre-Baker lines are
actually more favorable to urban interests than present-day
apportionments. This is because-as in the case of Maryland and
New York-the share of the state population living in urban areas has
fallen from 1960s levels. As "unfair" as the pre-Baker lines may have
been to urban interests in those days, in some cases they would now
produce new "rotten boroughs"-in the emptied-out neighborhoods
of places like Baltimore, Erie, and New York City. The lesson
learned from this imagined tour is that malapportionment, by itself, is
not a sign of poor representation. Indeed, plans drawn under one
person, one vote sometimes may be more biased than plans with
districts that vary widely in population."' 3
122. With respect to the number of districts in which Democrats constitute a majority,
the 2000 lines favored the Democrats much more than the 1960 lines would have. Under
the 2000 lines, Democrats have majorities in 75.0% of the districts (thirty of forty),
whereas they would only have majorities in 52.5% of the districts (twenty-one of forty) if
the 1960 lines remained in place. In a state where only 56.6% of the registered voters are
Democrats, the 1960 lines appear much more representative. As mentioned in the
footnotes above, this is true for three of the four states (California, Maryland, and
Delaware). Only New York has 2000 lines where the percent of Democratic district
majorities more accurately reflect the state's partisan breakdown than do the 1960 lines
mapped onto 2000 data.
123. Some readers of this Article have commented that our examination of partisan
representation represents a limited assessment of the representational effects of one
person, one vote. Although we think examining the effect of Baker on partisan
competition and representation is important, see supra note 76, we understand its
limitations. Indeed, further research should look at the one-person, one-vote rule's effect
on the parties as opposed to its effect on representation of the parties or competition
between them. We would begin such a study with these somewhat contradictory
hypotheses: (1) one person, one vote strengthened and polirized parties in the
legislatures by giving party whips and cronies the power to punish defectors in each
redistricting cycle; (2) the rule led to polarization of the parties in the legislature to the
degree that now districts were safer and more pure (that is, more districts with 70% party
majorities) so the median voter in each district was now farther away from the median
voter in the state; (3) the rule weakened party organizations to the degree decennial
redistricting contributed to the incumbency advantage and led to a "personal vote" for
legislators; and (4) one person, one vote increased the importance of primary elections
since under bipartisan gerrymanders primaries are now more likely to be the
determinative elections. These hypotheses are difficult to test and are certainly in tension
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CONCLUSION
Forty years after Baker v. Carr, we have finally begun to
understand the early political effects of the Court's one-person, one-
vote rule. Unfortunately for the observer who wanted to see a tally
sheet with clear winners and losers, the decisions had complicated
effects that were quite context-specific. The impact of the Court's
decision depended on a host of other factors and strategies other
institutional actors pursued.
Just because the impact of the decisions varied from state to state
and among institutional contexts does not mean that interesting,
systematic effects cannot be observed or that the rationale for the
Court's foray into this arena cannot be tested. For those who saw in
the redistricting decisions a dream of increased electoral competition
at the district level, those hopes have largely been dashed. And for
those who thought one person, one vote would prevent those in
control of the redistricting process from drawing lines to their
advantage, decennial redistricting may have made partisan and
bipartisan gerrymandering a more regularized ritual, even if change in
control of state legislatures became more frequent in the post-Baker
era. On the other hand, new research suggests that the bias (in favor
of rural interests or one party's core constituencies) inherent in pre-
Baker state legislatures and in the U.S. Congress vanished, in part
because of judicial supervision of the redistricting process. Finally,
Reynolds's rejection of the federal model for state legislatures led to
duplication and similarity between lower and upper houses.
Whereas, prior to Reynolds and its companion cases, the two houses
of a state's legislature often adhered to different philosophies of
representation, afterwards the bases of representation for the two
houses were quite similar. Consequently, the partisan makeup of
state chambers also became more similar.
Baker and its progeny sent an earthquake through a political
system that was already being tossed and turned in so many
directions. Although the turbulence of the time probably had more
direct and substantial political effects, the Court's decisions helped
express this turbulence in institutional forms. Already weakened by
extraordinary events such as the Kennedy assassination, the 1964
election, and the Voting Rights Act, and worn down by long-term
trends such as declining party identification and a rising incumbency
advantage, the political system that received "one person, one vote"
with one another, but could provide a useful starting point for further research.
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found the new redistricting rules to present opportunities to magnify
and codify the changes already taking place.
The lessons learned from studying the political effects of one
person, one vote are both humbling and illuminating. On the one
hand, lawyers and judges ought not exaggerate the rule's independent
effect on the political system. Political actors usually find a way to
achieve pre-existing goals even under new legal regimes. On the
other, new legal rules can seriously exacerbate or help channel
concurrent environmental changes. The difficult task for those of us
who analyze and advocate for such changes in the law of politics is to
learn from these judicial experiments so as to prevent perverse
consequences the next time around. Representing as they do the
most substantial intrusion of the courts into politics, the one-person,
one-vote decisions deserve to be analyzed, even four decades later, so
we can discover increasingly relevant lessons about the consequences
of judicial regulation for legislative representation and electoral
competition.
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